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Do Households Anchor their Inflation Expectations? 
Theory and Evidence from a Household Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
The purpose of the present paper is to study how households form inflation 
expectations. Using a novel survey-base dataset of Italian households’ opinions 
of inflation we investigate two separate, but related, types of behavior: 
‘inattentiveness’ and ‘anchoring’. The present analysis extends the existing 
literature by incorporating explicitly inflation targets and distinguishing between 
aggregate and disaggregate dynamics based on demographic groups. In addition, 
we extend the literature by considering both the short- and long-run dynamics as 
households update their inflation expectations while also accounting for their 
state-varying behavior. All these issues provide important insights into 
understanding actual inflation dynamics and the conduct of monetary policy.  
.  
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1. Introduction  
Most models explaining aggregate outcomes, such as business cycles and 
inflation dynamics, include households’ (or non-expert) expectations. Nevertheless, 
how households form their expectations about the macroeconomy is less well studied or 
understood. Two separate but related research have emerged recently to give important 
insights into the issue: ‘rational inattentive’ behavior and the ‘anchoring’ behavior of 
agent’s expectations with inflation targeting and central bank independence.   
The purpose of the present paper is to study how households form their inflation 
expectations - bringing together the main issues highlighted in this related research. The 
simple questions we ask are: To whom do households anchor when forming their 
inflation expectations? Do they anchor on the professional forecasts or on the Central 
Bank’s targets and, are these anchors mutually exclusive? The purpose is to consider the 
key features of these two important developments explaining how households may form 
their inflation expectations. In many respects, they are competing models and we wish 
to determine which behavior dominates.  
The underlying premise of the present analysis is also the one that motivates 
rational inattentive behavior, that is, the cost of acquiring relevant information. In a 
recent paper Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) suggested that central bank 
independence and explicit inflation targeting would reduce agents’ inattentiveness. The 
least costly option for a household would be to anchor expectations on the Central 
Bank’s target. However, this could also be the most costly option if these targets are not 
credible. While observing the professional forecasts and ascertaining the most recent 
actual inflation figures id costly, it may be worthwhile if the inflation targets set by 
monetary authorities lack credibility. Furthermore, for the general public to anchor on 
the professional forecast due to ignorance of the inflation target is not credible as it 
would be more costly to observe the former. The fact that professionals may anchor on 
an inflation target is coincidental — and the public would be unaware of this. Finally, it 
would be illogical for the public to acquire an inflation target via professional forecasts 
because it would be too costly. Nevertheless, we do not discount the fact that the public 
(or a proportion of the public) may look to anchor on both. During periods of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, they may look to both the inflation targets and professional 
forecasts.  
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The paper investigates these issues using a novel survey-base dataset of 
households’ opinions of inflation, which is compiled on a monthly basis from February 
2003 for Italy and within the framework of the harmonized project of the European 
Commission. The initial empirical analysis follows the aggregate approach of the 
‘sticky information expectations’ literature. Subsequently, we extend the analysis, 
accounting for individual household characteristics, using a pseudo-panel approach. 
Using a novel survey-based dataset allows us to investigate household behavior at 
disaggregate level distinguishing between various demographic groups.   
  A number of recent influential papers have introduced the notion of ‘rational 
inattentive’ behavior to explain how non-experts form expectations of the 
macroeconomy. Specifically, Reis (2006a; 2006b) argue that both consumers and 
producers update their information set sporadically. Producers do not continuously 
update their production plans but choose a price for their output and an optimal time at 
which to be inattentive, that is they receive no news about the economy until it is time 
to plan again. Similarly, time-constrained consumers optimize their utility and 
undertake consumption decisions infrequently. The slow diffusion of information 
among the general population is due to the costs of acquiring information as well as the 
costs of reoptimization. Such ‘sticky information’ expectations has been used to explain 
not only inflation dynamics (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) but also aggregate outcomes in 
general (Mankiw and Reis, 2007) and the implications for monetary policy (Ball et al., 
2005). 
Recently, Carroll (2003; 2006) put forward a specific form of ‘sticky 
information’ expectations that best explains how households form their expectations 
about the macroeconomy. ‘Epidemiological expectations’ argue that households form 
their expectations by observing professional forecasts which are reported in the news 
media. They, however, observe the professional forecasts imperfectly by ‘absorbing’ 
over time and, eventually, the professional forecasts are transmitted throughout the 
entire population. This proposition is verified empirically using a US household-based 
survey (Michigan SRC) and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Lanne et al. 
(2009) considered an interesting extension of Carroll’s epidemiological model. They 
showed empirically that a hybrid version of the sticky information model explains how 
households form their expectations; partly forming their expectations naïvely on 
recently released inflation rates and partly on professional forecasts. When analyzing 
households and non-experts in general it is useful not to consider them homogeneously. 
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Indeed, Bryan and Venkatu (2001a; 2001b) focused on demographic differences 
(specifically gender differences) when investigating households forming inflation 
expectations and perceptions. It is also important to highlight at this stage that recently 
the notion and study of ‘inattentiveness’ have also been extended to professional 
forecasters and financial market experts (see Andrade and Le Bihan, 2010; and Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko, 2010).    
An important and closely related development has been to analyze whether 
households’ inflation expectations are ‘anchored’ on the inflation targets set by central 
banks (see for example, Levin et al., 2004; Kelly, 2008; Blanchflower & Mac Coille, 
2009; Gefang et al (2012) and references therein). Beechy et al. (2011), an important 
recent contribution to this literature, focuses on the anchoring behavior of experts’ (or 
professionals’) inflation expectations. This literature also considers the issue of 
monetary policy credibility. By and large these studies concentrating on professional 
forecasters and the financial market experts have focused on long-run forecasting 
horizons between three to five-years ahead forecasts. Nevertheless, recently Coibion 
and Gorodnichencko (2010) studying the forecasting behavior of both professional 
forecasters and households used short-run forecasting horizons of between six to 
twelve-months ahead forecasts. Also, Dovern et al (2012) studying the ‘anchoring’ 
behavior of professional forecasters by investigating the level of disagreements amongst 
their forecasts have used one-year ahead forecasts. When studying how households 
form macroeconomic expectation in general (and also specifically their ‘anchoring’ 
behavior) one is not only constrained by the lack of availability of long-term forecasting 
horizons data but also its appropriateness; Carroll (2003 and 2006) has argued that 
households are not able to distinguish the differences between forecasts for different 
horizons and, hence, these forecasts may be highly correlated.     
 The present empirical results clearly indicate that households anchor their 
expectations on professional forecasts. We also find that households are excessively 
sensitive to current inflation (or perceptions of current inflation) when forming their 
expectations. The estimated inflation expectations of all households are also 
considerably higher than the European Central Bank (ECB) targets for the period, 
despite their anchoring on professional forecasts, which approximates the inflation 
targets. These results are consistent with the findings of Coibion and Gorodnichencko 
(2010) and Dovern et al (2012) who find little evidence of inflation-targeting effecting 
expectations formation. In addition, households’ inflation expectations tend to be lower 
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with education (the university-educated having the lowest). Similarly, the absorption 
rates increase with education. There are also clear differences in behavior between male 
and females for all categories of households considered.  
 Our analysis further considers the role of current inflation when households 
form their expectations. We find that current signals are used to determine the future 
direction of inflation rates, and households respond to them asymmetrically. In fact, the 
non-linear absorption rates of all households increase considerably when they expect 
future inflation rates to rise. Our investigations also consider another interesting aspect 
of households’ absorption rates: we test whether households overreact when they 
initially receive professional forecasts. When agents absorb or update their ‘anchored’ 
expectations imperfectly or update their information sporadically, one cannot rule out 
that they may overreact in the short run to new information. In most cases they may 
choose to update their expectations during periods of macroeconomic uncertainty or 
volatility and may simply be reflecting this.    
The present paper contributes to existing literature and debates as follows: 
firstly, it studies the important issue of ‘inattentiveness’ and ‘anchoring’ focusing on 
households’ using a novel dataset which covers the period of explicit inflation targeting 
by the European Central Bank (ECB). Similar to some recent research we consider a 
broader notion of ‘anchoring’ behavior allowing for short-run forecast horizons. 
However, unlike the previous literature we explicitly allow our model for the possibility 
that inflation targets are part of the households’ inflation expectations formation. 
Furthermore, the sample period covers the current economic crisis in the Eurozone, 
thereby, enabling us to consider any possible variations in households’ inflation 
expectations formation. Secondly, we also investigate the heterogeneity of households’ 
behavior by distinguishing inattentiveness and anchoring between different 
demographic groups. As Dovern et al (2012) show, disagreements between professional 
forecasters are an important aspect of assessing their anchoring behavior. The present 
investigation outlines and distinguishes between both the aggregate and disaggregate 
approach. Thirdly, the current analysis distinguishes between the short- and long-run 
dynamics of households when form inflation expectations. It not only incorporates the 
excess sensitivity of household expectations formation but also their adjustment 
dynamics. We find that in the short-run expectations tend to overshoot, or overreact, 
and, therefore, converge non-monotonically. Finally, the present analysis considers and 
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finds that households update their expectations non-linearly – indicating that household 
inattentiveness tends to be state-varying.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the issues that 
will be considered in the light of the models’ specification, and leads to a model which 
extends Carroll’s epidemiological version of the ‘sticky information expectations’ 
model. Section 3 describes the dataset and reports some preliminary empirical results 
conducted either along the individual dimension in repeated cross-sections, or over time 
at the aggregate level. Section 4 extends the analysis to different categories. The 
surveyed households are grouped into pseudo-individuals whose categories are defined 
on the basis of the households’ individual characteristics. In addition, we also allow for 
both heterogeneity and nonlinearities in the groups’ behavior. Finally, Section 5 outlines 
the summary of the key results and draws the concluding points.  
2. Household inflation expectations, inattentiveness and anchoring: 
The theoretical framework 
In this section we consider the broader notion of ‘inattentive’ and ‘anchoring’ 
behavior which is more consistent with non-experts, or households, forming inflation 
expectations. This is done by extending the epidemiological version of households 
forming macroeconomic expectations (Carroll (2003; 2006)) which also enables us to 
consider the possible competing hypotheses. As shown in Easaw and Golinelli (2010), 
the epidemiological model can be extended readily to incorporate both the long- and 
short-run dynamics of household expectations formation. In the present analysis we also 
consider both the long- and short-run dynamics of household’s year-ahead forecasts.  
The extended version incorporates explicitly the inflation target as part of the 
long-run dynamics of households’ expectations formation. Nevertheless, the excess 
sensitive test used to assess the anchoring behavior of agent’s inflation forecasts argues 
these expectations should not be excessively sensitive to actual inflation or their own 
perceptions of current inflation2. Hence, households update their expectations 
                                                 
2  They can be assessed by comparing estimation results either across counties, as in Levin et al. 
(2004), or over time, as in Kelly (2008) and in Blanchflower and Mac Coille (2009). Also, while previous 
studies have only considered actual inflation, households’ perception of current inflation should also be 
used, if available. There could be a number of reasons why households may form current inflation 
perceptions and base their actions on them. Actual inflation is only available with some lag and also 
individual households may experience different inflation levels given their respective consumption 
baskets and the official figures may only partially reflect this.  
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independently of changes to the current (or the most recently published) inflation rate 
and/or to their perceptions of current inflation. It, therefore, focuses on the short-run 
dynamics of households’ forming inflation expectations. The extended epidemiological 
model presented here accordingly incorporates both the long and short-run dynamics of 
households’ inflation expectations formation.  
A rational inattentive household imperfectly observes professional forecasts , 
which are assumed to be rational. Hence households have partial access to rational 
information (see Mankiw and Reis, 2002) which are ‘absorbed’ over time. The 
epidemiological model where households anchor on the professional forecasts can be 
depicted as follows:  
tt
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where )( 1t
h
tE  are household inflation expectations and )( 1tFtE   denotes the 
professional forecasts, which individuals can learn from the media news and  the 
absorption rate. Equation (1), which assumes the dynamics of a simple partial 
adjustment mechanism, can be generalized in the error-correction (referred to as EC 
hereafter) specification, where short- and long-run dynamics are not restricted to share 
the same absorption (or adjustment) rate –, but allow for two different parameters, 1  
and 2 , which respectively drive the short- and the long-run dynamics:3 
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The adjustment toward long-run levels requires 2 < 0. Under the restriction 1 + 2 = 0 
model (1) is nested in model (2). The rejection of the latter restriction is consistent with 
EC dynamics where short-run overshooting, or overreaction, could take place as 
households learn about professional forecasts. In fact, in the EC context of model (2), 1 
is the impact effect of professional forecasts as households absorb and can be larger 
than one. Likewise, -(1+2) has the same effect measured one month later, i.e. as 
households update their expectations in t for t+1 to those of professional forecasts in t-1 
for t. 4  
                                                 
3  A change in professional forecasts is defined as: )()()( 111 t
F
tt
F
tt
F
t EEE    ; similarly 
for the update of households’ inflation expectations, )( 1 thtE  .  
4  The explanatory variables of impact and one-month-later absorption parameters are )( 1t
F
tE   
and )(1 t
F
tE  . For the extension of Carroll’s epidemiological model to the EC model see also Easaw and 
Golinelli (2010). 
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Carroll’s epidemiological model (1) can be easily extended to allow the 
possibility that households’ expectations are formed incorporating their own inflation 
perceptions, the most recently available figure of the actual inflation rate5, and the 
inflation target 
  (which is assumed to be time invariant):  
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Here households’ inflation expectations are anchored potentially on the four measures 
with i  depicting the weights. The four possible anchors are: professional forecasts 
(i=1), households’ perceived inflation 
hP ,  (i=2), actual inflation rate   (i=3), and the 
inflation target  (i=4). Households are assumed to form their expectations by switching 
between the variables above as dictated by the prevailing economic conditions and 
situation.   
Equation (3) dynamics may be generalized to obtain the basic model for 
empirical investigation encompassing the different approaches of the anchoring 
literature (i.e. the short-run dynamics and excess sensitivity) and Carroll’s 
epidemiological dynamics6: 
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where i1  (i = 1, 2, 3) are three parameters measuring short-run fluctuations of 
households’ expectations due to changes in professional forecasts (i=1), in households’ 
perceived inflation (i=2), and in one-month lagged actual inflation (i=3); 2  is the 
speed of adjustment toward the long run; i  parameters are defined as in equation (3).  
Similar to equation (2), the EC dynamics found in equation (4) can also allow 
for the overreaction of households expectations formed in t for t+1 if 211    (i.e. 
                                                 
5  Actual inflation is one-month lagged in order to account for the publication delay of the official 
figures. In a recent paper, Lanne et al. (2009) introduces an extended or hybrid model of Carroll (2003) 
which similarly includes current inflation signals.  
 
6  Here, for simplicity, we assume that households’ expected inflation is generated by a first-order 
dynamics. During empirical analysis, if the test for residuals’ autocorrelation of model (4) rejects the null, 
we can augment it with lags of the short-run regressors in differences to attain white noise residuals.  
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1
2
11  

). Concurrently, the overreacting households revise their expectations in t-1 for 
t if 1
2
11 
  . 7 
Inflation targets in model (4) are part of the long-run dynamics of households’ 
year-ahead inflation expectations. However, assuming that the target is time invariant 
over the sample period, the constant in equation (4) corresponds to the parameter: 
T 42 . This, however, does not allow us to identify two separate values for 4  and 
T . It is not possible to verify whether T is consistent with the inflation target, which 
in the present case is 2%, i.e. the ECB quantitative definition of ‘price stability’.8 
Nevertheless, even if households anchor on this target, it can only be credible if 
%24 T or, alternatively, if 14  .  
The remainder of the paper will focus on the empirical investigation of the 
model outlined here. The various issues and competing hypotheses are also considered 
using a number of restrictions tests.  
3. Measurement of the variables and a preliminary inspection to data 
The information on inflation perceptions and expectations that will be used 
troughout the paper is extracted from the monthly ISTAT Consumers survey, performed 
within the framework of the EC Harmonised project9. The survey mainly consists of 
qualitative questions on the personal situation of the consumer and the country. 
Questions allow five possible answers, ranging from strongly positive to strongly 
negative; results are usually expressed as weighted balances of positive and negative 
replies. The survey is conducted with a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
(CATI) system; it is based on a monthly sample of 2.000 Italian consumers, changing 
each month, for a total of 24.000 persons interviewed per year. The sample is extracted 
from the public telephone book registers and selected on the basis of a two-stage 
                                                 
7  Further explanations about the overreaction and revision are found in Appendix A1. 
8  Since the beginning of its activity, the ECB did not adopt a proper inflation targeting strategy; 
however, according to its Statute, the main ECB mandate is to ensure ‘price stability’ in the Euro area. 
The ECB has provided a quantitative definition of price stability, i.e. any increase of the HICP below 2% 
for the whole Euro area to be complied within a medium term perspective (for a presentation of the 
monetary policy strategy of the ECB, see e.g. Scheller, 2006, section 3.1.2). In this sense we can interpret 
the 2%-threshold, as measured by the Euro-area HICP, as an implicit target for ECB monetary policy.  
9  For a more comprehensive description of the harmonised EU programme see European 
Commission (2006). 
  11
technique: in the first step, it is stratified according to zone of residence and size of 
municipalities; the second stage is based on the selection of a specific consumer within 
the household selected in the first step. This selection is based on quota sampling 
according to gender (48,5% males, 51,5% females).  
Quota sampling ensures that sample size is always equal to the target, substituting 
non response with other consumers extracted from the sample; the response rate of the 
survey, calculated as the ratio among the number of the respondents and that of total 
monthly contacts has been equal to about 66% in recent years. Individual replies are 
aggregated with a double-weighting system based on probability and post-stratification 
weights. Probability weights – i.e., the inverse of the selection probability - are used to 
correct for possible selection bias associated with the nature of the reference list and the 
size of the family; post stratification weights correct for possible representativeness 
problems stemming, for instance, from the fact that women are easier to contact than 
men, or unemployed and retired people than employee or self-employed (other 
information is available in Malgarini, 2009). Since February 2003 two questions have 
been added to the traditional qualitative monthly questionnaire, asking consumers to 
provide quantitative estimates of their perceived and expected inflation (see Biau et al., 
2010); the available dataset has a total of 93 monthly observations, from February 2003 
to October 2010. .  
The two questions concerning quantitative inflation perceptions and expectations 
are the following: 10  
Q51   By how many per cent do you think that consumer prices have gone up/down 
over the past 12 months? (Please give a single figure estimate). 
 Consumer prices have increased by    ,  %  / decreased by    ,  %. 
 
Q61   By how many per cent do you expect consumer prices to go up/down change in 
the next 12 months? (Please give a single figure estimate). 
 Consumer prices will increase by    ,  %  / decreased by    ,  %. 
 
Quantitative evaluations are asked as a single figure estimate. The questionnaire 
asks for confirmation if answers exceed a 20% threshold11; moreover, answers are 
bounded within the range ±100%. Participation rates to quantitative questions have been 
                                                 
10  The IISTAT survey provides point forecasts about inflation expected for 12 months ahead; no 
information is available on individual uncertainty about future inflation. On the significance of that kind 
of information in evaluating Central Bank credibility, see for instance De Bruin et al. (2009).  
11  In its survey, the University of Michigan asks for confirmation if the answer is greater than 5%.  
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rather high on average, being equal to almost 88% for assessments and 84% for 
forecasts in the period considered.  
In the following, the individual inflation expectations over the next 12 months 
and the individual inflation perceptions over the past 12 months are respectively 
denoted as )( 1t
h
tE   and hPt , .  
The h index in the labels above can alternatively represent (and measure):  
1. the N monthly survey’s individual answers — in this case h = 1, 2, ... , N (with 
N = 2000 households). Note that the whole information set is not a panel, as the 
same people are not interviewed repeatedly, but are simple repeat cross-sections 
of NT observations, where we pool together all the available monthly surveys 
(cross-sections).  
2. the monthly average of the N individual survey’s answers — in this case the 
information set is a single time series of T = 93 monthly observations, h = M 
(which stands for ‘mean’).  
3. we can average the N monthly answers in G groups (i.e. pseudo-individuals) 
defined on the basis of individual characteristics also reported by the survey 
(such as gender, age, education, and employment) — in this case h = 1, 2, ... , G 
(with G being much smaller than N). The resulting information set is a pseudo 
panel of GT observations; with Italian survey data see e.g. Malgarini et al. 
(2009).  
 
In the Italian case, the professional forecast time series )( 1t
F
tE   lacks an 
obvious way to measure it, such as the Survey of Professional Forecasters for the US. 
For this reason, we had to compute a consensus forecast, defined as the average of the 
Italy’s inflation forecasts made by different national and international institutes whose 
predictions are usually highlighted by the media as soon as they are issued.12  
The actual inflation rate t  is measured by ISTAT with monthly time series 
based on either the national consumer price index (CPI), or the more recent harmonized 
index of consumer prices (HICP)  to give comparable measures of inflation for 
Euroland countries. With any index of consumer prices monthly inflation may be 
alternatively measured by the growth rate of the index over the past 12 months (y-o-y) 
                                                 
12  Details are in Appendix A2.1 - A2.2. 
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or by its annualized monthly growth rate (m-o-m); see e.g. Lanne et al. (2009). Both 
choices have its pros and cons: y-o-y growth is slightly more used and easy to 
communicate the inflation rate but implies a more complex dynamics (i.e. with moving 
average error terms which in turn may imply long autoregressive lags); viceversa m-o-m 
growth is slightly more difficult to communicate but its dynamics is easier to model. In 
the following parts we report results with both the annualized m-o-m growth rate of CPI 
and the y-o-y growth rate of HICP. As we will see, outcomes are robust to these 
alternative inflation measures. 
Overall, the three alternative levels of aggregation of the survey data described 
above lead to very different information sets: (1) repeated cross-sections; (2) aggregate 
time series; (3) pseudo panels. In the following two sections, we will preliminarily 
analyze the main features of type (1) and (2) data, respectively. 
3.1. Analyzing the repeated cross sections data-set 
The first information set mentioned above is a repeated cross-sections for 
)( 1t
h
tE   and hPt ,  and not a panel. Therefore, it does not allow for the estimation of 
dynamic models such as those in Section 2 where individual inflation expectations and 
perceptions are lagged or in differences.  
However, with such a large data-set (about 130,000 individual observations) we 
can assess whether average inflation expectations computed by individual 
characteristics (such as employment, education, gender, and age) are similar or tend to 
by related with some of the respondents’ characteristics. Results are in Table 1, where 
columns (1)-(2) describe the sample composition (number of individuals and share over 
the total) of selected characteristics usually found in the literature to influence the 
formation of inflation expectations, and columns (3)-(4) report the corresponding 
unconditional means and standard deviations of inflation forecasts by characteristic. 
Table 1 here 
At a first look, the large disparity in the forecasts made by different groups 
clearly emerges, together with some regularities. For example, as with the findings of 
Malgarini (2009), expected inflation decreases with age and education (older people 
with a degree predict smaller price increases than those who are younger and less 
educated) and women expect higher rates of inflation than men. Similar results are often 
found in literature (see Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) for the US, and Blanchflower and 
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Mac Coille (2009) for the UK), though some researchers find quite different outcomes, 
see Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) for the UK. 
Of course, being based on unconditional means, results in column (3) are related 
because individual characteristics are often mutually related too. For example, age, 
employment and income13 co-move since it is quite obvious that older people probably 
are no longer employed (pensioners), and — consequently — both groups tends to 
predict lower-than-average inflation rates.  
In order to disentangle the (marginal) effect of a change in one characteristic, 
while other characteristics remain unchanged, in column (5) of Table 1 we report the 
estimates of a simple dummy variables model such as: 
h
t
h
tkt
h
t kDE   )()( 01       (5) 
where observations about individual inflation expectations are regressed against the 
intercept and k dummy variables equal to 1 if the corresponding individual has the kth 
characteristic, zero otherwise. In model (5), k = 11 and the specific characteristics 
involved - listed along the rows of Table 1 - are: 4 for employment (self-employed, blue 
collar, pensioner, and other); 3 for education (university, lower-secondary, and 
elementary); 1 for gender (female); and 3 for age (less than 30, between 50 and 64, and 
over 64). The errors 
h
t  are random shock reflecting idiosyncratic preferences. 
The 11 characteristics mentioned above do not cover all the possible cases, for 
this the OLS estimate of the intercept 0  measures the mean of the inflation 
expectations of the individuals who do not have any of the previous 11 characteristics, 
i.e. the reference group.14 We set the reference group as: male aged 30-49 with upper 
secondary education and white-collar employee. Given the definition of reference group 
as that collecting high frequency cases, the average inflation rate expected for the 
reference group (measured by 0  parameter whose estimate is in the last row of 
column 5) is bound to be very close to the full-sample unconditional mean reported in 
the last row of column (3). 
In model (5), the estimates of k  represent the deviations of the mean inflation 
of each of the k characteristics to that of the reference group (i.e.  the estimate of 0 ). 
                                                 
13  Income was not used here because many observations would have been lost due to non 
responses. However, Malgarini (2009) finds that income, together with the size of municipality, does not 
affect inflation expectations.  
14  The exclusion from the model of the dummies corresponding to the reference group 
characteristics prevents the insurgence of the dummy variable trap. 
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On the basis of the t-statistics of the corresponding k estimates, we can test for the null 
hypothesis: 0k  in order to formally assess for the significance of such deviations.  
In the light of the results in column (5) of Table 1 we have that, apart from 
pensioners and people under 30, all other deviations from the reference group forecasts 
are at least 5% (very often 1%) significantly different from zero. Being self-employed 
or aged over 64 induces the largest absolute deviations from the reference group: 
respondents belonging to these two categories hold more than 1% lower inflation 
expectations than that of the reference group (more than 1.5% per year for older 
people). Vice versa, less educated people expect about one percentage point more 
inflation than the reference group. We confirm the existence of significantly different 
inflation forecasts for men and women - though in a less pronounced way than Bryan 
and Venkatu (2001b).  
Results reported in column (6) of Table 1 are based on the dummy variables 
model (6) which is only slightly different to model (5), as the intercept 0  is 
substituted by a common time pattern (the so called “time effects”) represented by the 
sequence of 93 parameters t  corresponding to 93 time dummies t  (one time dummy 
for each observed month-year in the sample): 
h
t
h
tkttt
h
t kDE   )()( 1       (6) 
where t  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in t, zero otherwise; each 
time effect t  is the average expected inflation of the reference group for each time 
period.15 The interpretation of the parameters of interest k  in model (6) is the same as 
in model (5), and the same is true for the random errors 
h
t .  
Overall, the estimation of model (6) parameters in column (6) of Table 1 
suggests that the outcomes in column (5) discussed above are robust to the inclusion of 
93 time effects. In other terms, the inclusion of a deterministic time pattern does not 
curb the significance of the individual characteristics’ ability in explaining inflation 
expectations  
                                                 
15  Note also that 

93
1t
t  is a vector of ones, and that the average of the time effects (i.e. the 93 
estimates of t ) measures the average level over time of the reference group’s inflation expectations. 
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Finally, by using the same repeated cross-section dataset it is possible to further 
extend the explanation of the idiosyncratic shocks 
h
t  of models (5) and (6) by adding 
in a new model (7) the perceptions of inflation over the twelve months preceding each 
survey date (
hP
t
, ), the consensus forecasts ( )( 1tFtE  ), and their interactions with the 
k individual characteristics listed above:  
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   (7) 
where P  and F  are two parameters measuring the effect of hPt ,  and of )( 1tFtE   
on the inflation forecasts of the reference group; Pk  and Fk  (k = 1, 2, ..., 11) are 22 
parameters that represent the deviations to P  and F  effects for the reference group 
due to each of the k characteristics. 
 If we group the 11 characteristics k in the 4 categories c listed in the first column 
of Table 1 (i.e. c = employment, education, gender and age), we can test for significant 
deviations with respect to the reference group due to c in the way the perceived inflation 
influences the inflation forecasts as: ckH Pk  0:0   , i.e. in terms of p-values of 
joint zero restrictions imposed to the parameters of each characteristic belonging to 
category c. The same can be tested for consensus inflation forecasts. 
 Along the three columns of data in Table 2, the main estimation outcomes are 
reported with reference to respectively: (a) model (5) with only individual 
characteristics (the same as that used in column (5) of Table 1); (b) model (6) with 
individual characteristics and time dummies (the same as that used in column (6) of 
Table 1); (c) model (7) which also adds the inflation perceptions, the consensus 
forecasts, and their interactions with the 11 individual characteristics defined so far. The 
last row in Table 2 highlights the increment in the number of parameters to be estimated 
going from the model in the first to that in the last column: model (6) adds 92 
parameters to those in model (5), model (7) adds 24 parameters to those in model (6). 
Table 2 here 
Results in terms of p-values of joint zero restrictions imposed to the parameters 
of each category can be summarized as follows. In the last column of Table 2 it is 
evident that the very often significant introduction of the interactions between perceived 
inflation (and consensus forecasts) and individual characteristics curbs the statistical 
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significance of the shifts due to the individual characteristics, while such shifts are 
largely significant in models (5) and (6) that do not have interactions; see the first two 
columns of Table 2 which mirror the outcomes in the last two columns of Table 1.  
The significance of many ‘incremental’ regressors from model (5) to model (7) 
in Table 2 can be seen in terms of improvements in the models’ explanatory ability 
when additional variables are added. In fact, model (5) with only individual 
characteristics is able to explain only a very small portion of the overall variability of 
individual inflation forecasts (in the first column of Table 2 the R2 is equal to 0.005) 
because it misses regressors able explain the evolution of expected inflation over time. 
Such time patterns can be captured, albeit in a rough deterministic way, by the inclusion 
of the time effects in model (6); consequently the explanatory ability rises to 0.184. 
Finally, model (7) explanatory ability further rises to about 0.3 because of the presence 
of interactions among individual characteristics and the evolution over time of both the 
perceived inflation and the consensus inflation forecast. 
 On the basis of the evidence reported in this section, we preliminary support the 
view that individual characteristics induce heterogeneous behaviors by groups of 
individuals, rather than simple average shifts of expected inflation. In other terms, 
expected inflation is better explained by models in which group-specific parameters 
allow individuals to react with different speeds to the perceived and to the consensus 
inflation. Further, the better explanatory ability of models which embody regressors 
able to explain the evolution over time of households’ inflation expectations stresses the 
need for an appropriate modelling of its dynamics.   
3.2. Aggregate time-series results  
Outcomes in the previous section are based on very simplified specifications of 
model (4), because repeated cross sections do not allow for dynamics of the surveyed 
variables, which on the other hand is a distinctive feature of the referenced literature. A 
way to introduce truly dynamic models using individual survey data is their aggregation 
over individuals by defining the variables )( 1t
M
tE   and MPt ,  as the monthly 
averages of the corresponding individual answers: 
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This aggregate approach is the most commonly used in the literature about modeling 
inflation expectations; see Carroll (2003), Lanne et al. (2009), and Mankiw et al. 
(2003), amongst others.  
There are a number of possible restrictions to the general model (8) to verify the 
statistical performance of the nested models of the anchoring literature (i.e. excess 
sensitivity) and of the epidemiological dynamics. In particular, the inferences using 
models in first differences— as excess sensitivity literature does — are appropriate only 
if 02  , as only in this case the levels of the explanatory variables can be excluded 
from the reference model of the test. Carroll’s ‘pure’ epidemic dynamics in model (1) is 
a data congruent representation of the process generating the households’ expectations 
only if the following restrictions are valid: 01312   , 032    (which exclude 
the role of actual and perceived inflation in both levels and first differences), plus 
211    and 11   (which collapse the dynamics in a simple partial adjustment).16  
At the aggregate level, equation (8) can be seen as a first-order autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model. This allows us to model the relationship without needing 
to establish a priori the variables as I(1) or I(0) due to the findings of Pesaran et al. 
(2001), henceforth PSS. The PSS approach is appropriate here, because the three 
explanatory variables of our ARDL model can be considered as the forcing levels of 
households’ inflation expectations in the light of exogeneity tests both in the stationary 
(Hausman, 1978) and in the non-stationary (Johansen, 1992) context: we never reject 
the null with p-values well above 20%.17 
In the PSS framework, the 5% critical values of 2  t-statistic to test for the 
existence of a relationship among the levels of the variables of interest are -2.86 and -
3.78 for I(0) and I(1) regressors, respectively.  
Estimation results of model (8) as well as the outcomes of the general-to-
specific modeling approach are reported along the columns of Table 3. More explicitly, 
the first two columns of Table 3 report the estimates of two alterative specifications of 
                                                 
16  On the latter point, see also Appendix A1. 
17  The unreported results of the paper are available upon request from the authors, together with 
the corresponding procedures to implement them. From the point of view of the information content of 
the three variables of interest, there cannot be feedback from the levels of households’ forecasts to past 
actual inflation, to professional forecasts (as they release their forecasts before households are surveyed), 
and to households’ inflation perceptions (which regard past 12 months while expectations regard next 12 
months). Given that in the latter case both variables may be driven by the same moods as they are 
surveyed at the same time, we validated the exogeneity assumption using the exogeneity tests discussed 
above. 
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the “general” model (8) – i.e. with two alternative measures of the actual inflation rate – 
then, in the following columns, we restrict to zero the parameters whose estimates were 
previously not significant; the aim of this gradual model reduction is to report evidence 
about the robustness of the role played by our “core determinants” (i.e. dynamics, 
perceived inflation - but only in the short run -, and consensus forecasts) independently 
on the presence or not of the other, not significant, regressors (i.e. levels of perceived 
inflation and the actual inflation rate). Not reported residuals’ misspecification test 
results suggest that one lag is enough to obtain well behaved (i.e. i.i.d) residuals for all 
the estimates in Table 3.  
Table 3 here 
Overall, the model explains more than 35% of the changes in the inflation 
expectations variability over the period 2003m3-2010m10, which corresponds to about 
85% of the levels in the inflation expectations variability.18  
We identify five main results. First, a level relationship exists between 
households’ inflation expectations and consensus forecasts irrespective of the 
integration order of the regressors, as shown by all the t-statistics of 2  estimates in 
Table 3 that range from -4.44 to -4.28. This outcome questions the appropriateness of 
making inferences about anchoring on the basis of models in differences. Instead, 
Carroll’s epidemiological model is only partially survey data congruent because, though 
it assumes the existence of level-relationships, its partial adjustment dynamics implies 
restrictions on error-correction parameters which are always rejected by data. The 
estimates of the speed of adjustment 2  (around -0.3) suggest that about 30% of the gap 
between actual and target levels of inflation expectations is closed in the first month 
and, consequently, that the target inflation levels are met in the first year after the shock. 
This high speed of adjustment is coherent with the forecast horizon and makes quite 
informative the short span of available data (93 months from 2003 to 2010). In addition, 
it is also worth noting that — albeit short — our sample has the advantage of covering 
only the period following the changeover of January 2002, with less probable biases due 
to the occurrence of structural changes. In order to formally test for constancy of the 
parameters estimated in columns (4) and (5), we run both Andrews (1993) endogenous 
                                                 
18  Of course this R2 = 0.85 of model (8) cannot be compared with the (apparently) strongly lower 
0.3 of model (7) because here the averaging of individual data over individuals in period means 
dramatically reduced the sample variability. 
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breakpoint test (with 10% observations trimming), and Chow (1960) predictive failure 
test assuming the last cyclical peak (occurred in August 2007) as the exogenous 
breakpoint. In this way, we leave in the second part of the sample the financial crisis 
period, which is a good candidate for inducing a structural break. The statistics never 
reject at 5% the null hypothesis of parameters’ constancy with p-values of the Andrews 
endogenous breakpoint test equal to 8.3% and to 64.4% in column (4) and (5), i.e. for 
the restricted model with and without the intercept, and with p-values of the 
corresponding Chow predictive failure test equal to 11.0% and to 37.2%. It is also worth 
noting that, albeit not 5% significant, the maximum likely break point with the Andrews 
endogenous breakpoint procedure is dated in January 2008, i.e. quite close to the 
exogenous date we set for the Chow test, supporting the idea that in our sample the 
financial crisis is the most relevant event also from the point of view of the stability of 
the mechanism of forming inflation expectations. 
Second, households significantly overreact to professional forecasts in t for t+1, 
and they do not revise such overreaction based on professional forecasts in the past 
month. This is largely due to estimated 1 (i.e. impact effect of professional forecasts) 
being well above one, making the revision test more restrictive than the overreaction 
one. In short, informed households’ behavior may be characterized as short-run 
overreaction. 
Third, among the regressors of model (8), the actual inflation rate never plays a 
significant role. The finding is robust to the specific measure adopted for the actual 
inflation rate: either the model with annualized month-on-month growth of CPI in 
column (1), or that with year-on-year growth of HICP in column (2) never reject the 
null hypothesis 0313   with p-values equal to 22.6% and 64.5% respectively. The 
comparison between the unrestricted estimates in columns (1)-(2) and the restricted in 
column (3) suggests that the exclusion from the model of the latest known figure of the 
inflation rate does not entail significant changes in the estimates of the other parameters.  
 Fourth, not all the three regressors of model (8) — consensus forecasts, 
perceived and actual inflation rates — play a significant role in shaping households’ 
expected inflation level relationship, see the i  (with i = 1, 2, and 3) estimates in 
columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 3. The effect of consensus on individual forecasts is 
considerably large and significant, suggesting a strong reactivity of the levels of 
households’ expectations to it, while the other two drivers do not play any appreciable 
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role. After imposing the corresponding exclusion restrictions, the mean individual M’s 
(i.e. aggregate) model (8) collapses to: 
t
T
t
F
tt
M
t
MP
tt
F
tt
M
t
EE
EE






])()([
)()(
41112
,
121111
     (9) 
where the short-run changes in households’ expectations are driven by both changes in 
professional forecasts and in current inflation perceptions; the corresponding estimates 
are in column (4) of Table 3.  
Fifth, the interval estimation of the explicit (constant) target effect 4  is wide, 
ranging from negative to positive values, then not significantly different to zero. 
However, this fact cannot exclude anchoring on the (implicit) target passes through 
professional forecasters’ behavior. Under the assumption that the intercept is zero, 
estimates are reported in column (5) of Table 3. 
 We can exploit the steady state solution of the consensus inflation forecasts 
modelled as a simple AR model19 to measure the corresponding households expected 
inflation as: 
TFM EE  4*1* )()(        (10) 
Columns (4) and (5) in the lower part of Table 3 report the steady state solution in 
equation (10) on the basis of the consensus steady state 95% confidence interval which 
goes from 1.7% to 2.1%. Results suggest a 4.7-6.2% range to which households’ 
inflation forecasts converge in absence of short term shocks. These high figures mirrors 
what surveyed households report for both inflation perceptions and expectations, see 
Section 3.1.  
4. Modeling inflation expectations with pseudo-panel data 
 The exploratory analysis in the previous section highlights two important 
findings regarding Italian households’ formation of inflation expectations: firstly, 
groups of individuals, selected on the basis of pre-defined personal characteristics (such 
as education, gender and age), seem to approach inflation forecasts in different ways, 
leading to quite different levels of expected inflation, that have the common feature of 
being considerably higher than the actual inflation figures.  
                                                 
19  The full discussion is in Appendix A2.2. - A2.3 
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Secondly, at an economy-wide level (i.e. by using single time series of monthly 
averages of all the survey respondent), the dynamics of households’ inflation 
expectations follow in the short run changes in both consensus forecasts and perceived 
inflation over the recent past, while in the long run they are solely driven by the level of 
consensus of the professional forecasters. The long-run solution of the aggregate model 
suggests that households’ inflation expectations fall in a range well above the 2% ECB 
long-run inflation target, despite consensus forecasts that closely point to the 2% long 
run level20.  
 However, two drawbacks affect the methodologies that we followed to obtain 
these results: (1) on the repeated cross-section level, the lack of time dimension of 
individual data prevented us from estimating appropriate dynamic relationships which, 
instead, are an essential ingredient of both sticky-information and epidemic inflation 
expectation theoretical models; (2) on the aggregate time-series level, modeling results 
may be biased because of the parameters’ heterogeneity across groups. 
 In this section we will check the extent to which previous drawbacks may have 
corrupted our main findings. To do this, we will base our analysis on pseudo panels 
obtained by averaging individual data in groups whose categories are selected on the 
basis of the individual characteristics outlined in Tables 1 and 2. 
In defining the aggregation categories, we have to acknowledge that the number 
of surveyed individuals belonging to each pseudo panel’s group must be large enough to 
preserve the statistical properties of the pseudo-panel estimators (see Veerbek and 
Nijman, 1992). In addition, the unavoidable arbitrariness of any category definition 
suggests testing for the robustness of main findings to alternative ways of grouping 
individual observations. In this research, we define four alternative pseudo-panels with 
7-10 groups each; details about the groups’ definitions are in Table 4.  
Table 4 here 
4.1. Pooled mean group estimator for heterogeneous linear models 
Given that the time span of our data is quite wide and homogeneous (T = 93 
months, covering the post monetary changeover period) we estimated model (4) 
                                                 
20  In a recent study, Beechy et al. (2011) found that professional inflation forecasters in the 
Eurozone are more firmly anchored than their US counterparts and concluded that this is largely due to 
explicit inflation targeting from the ECB.   
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parameters under the assumption of full heterogeneity, i.e. a complete set of estimates is 
obtained for each panel’s group. The model (4) heterogeneous specification is: 
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where h = 1, 2, 3, ..., G (with G = 7 for the first panel definition, 8 for the second, 10 for 
the third, and 8 for the fourth; see Table 4).  
The estimation of the panel heterogeneous models by group (i.e. by each h), and 
the following analyses were conducted by broadly using the same methodology as that 
with aggregate time series. Results obtained with panel # 1 to # 4 are reported in Tables 
5-8, respectively. 
Table 5 here 
Starting from the heterogeneous estimates of model (11) parameters with panel # 
1, the existence of a level relationship among the variables of interest, i.e. 02 h  is 
assessed through the outcomes in the first two rows of Table 5, where h2  estimates and 
the corresponding t-statistics are reported. The critical values to be used for testing the 
null of absence of level relationships by group are again those of PSS (i.e. -2.86/-3.78). 
Results clearly indicate that the presence of levels is extremely relevant to have a 
congruent representation of data, as also found with aggregate time series. Given that 
not all the parameters of model (11) are significant, the following six rows of Table 5 
report the p-values of number tests for the joint significance of the parameters which 
measure the short- and long-run effects of the actual inflation rate, and the levels of the 
perceived inflation. Similar to the aggregate time series, we performed these tests on 
models where the actual inflation rate are measured alternatively by the annualised m-o-
m growth of CPI and by the y-o-y growth of the HICP.  
With the exception of the elementary-level educated respondent when the actual 
inflation is measured by the “easier to track” y-o-y HICP growth, these parameters are 
jointly never significant. Therefore, we restricted them to zero, i.e. 03213  hhh  . 
These restrictions, lead to the following parsimonious and data-congruent model: 
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Estimates of the relevant parameters (together with the t-statistics) and the goodness-of-
fit measures of each equation are reported in Table 5. It is worth to note that almost 
always the parameters of model (12) do not reject the null hypothesis of no breaks in the 
light of both Andrews (1993) and Chow (1960) tests that were run here with the same 
settings described in the aggregate time series section. 
For even more efficient inferences, we can use the Pesaran et al. (1999) 
approach of the pooled mean group estimators (PMG) if poolability tests allows for it. 
Under the PMG assumption, all the coefficients involved by the level-relationship are 
constrained to be identical across groups, i.e. ,11  h  while short-run coefficients 
hhh
21211 ,,  , and variances of errors ht  are still allowed to be heterogeneous; in 
symbols, our PMG model is written as: 
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where: 
Thhh  4210   represents some sort of time-invariant group effects. 
The inability to reject the restrictions that allow for the reduction from model 
(12) to (13), suggests that the maximum-likelihood method applied to PMG parameters 
is the most efficient estimator to make inferences about the determinants of households’ 
expected inflation.  
The PMG model always rejects further restrictions on the heterogeneous 
intercepts (i.e.: 44  h  and 04 h ), which in our context contributes to the measure 
of the targeting effect. Therefore, the last two rows of Table 5 report intervals for the 
steady state solution which differ by group. These intervals of the long-run expected 
inflation are based on the same steady state consensus forecast confidence interval of 
1.7-2.1%21, which we also used to compute the expectations’ steady state solution with 
aggregate data.  
Though the amplitude of the interval is always the same (about 1.5%), the steady 
state inflation expectations markedly differ by groups, as it is lower for the higher 
educated, with the university-educated having the lowest; the impact of working/not 
                                                 
21  Again, for details see Appendix A2.3. 
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working condition is not clear cut. Nevertheless, it is always considerably higher than 
that of the professional forecast for the period under consideration.22 
 The pseudo individuals’ absorption rates (i.e. the negative of the speed of 
adjustment h2 ) vary considerably for working/non working status and education, 
ranging from 0.80 to 0.31. University-educated individuals have the highest absorption 
rates with those not working absorbing a fifth faster. Conversely, those with elementary 
and lower secondary education adjust to the consensus forecasts considerably slower 
due to lower absorption rates. Nevertheless, those with lower secondary education who 
are in work are twice as fast as those not working. This group will not only be involved 
in wage negotiations but have greater opportunities for the social transmission of 
professional forecasts through interacting with others, especially in the workplace.  
 With regards to the overreaction dynamics, the lower part of Table 5 also reports 
the P-values of the two overreaction tests.23 Even though the simple overreaction 
model, which we found in the aggregate time series case, generally tends to prevail, the 
highest educated workers tend to depict the fully articulated dynamics of both short-run 
overreaction and overshot revision. 
 The results with pseudo panel # 1 in Table 5 can be verified by repeating the 
same procedure for the alternative groups. The different groups in panel # 1 were 
selected on the basis of the individuals’ education and employment. The two alternative 
panels are defined by crossing these two characteristics with gender; in particular, panel 
# 2 is defined on the basis of education and gender, and panel # 3 on the basis of 
employment and gender. Finally, given that age also played a significant role in cross-
section regressions, we also defined panel # 4 on the basis of age and gender.  
 Results using panels # 2 to # 4 are reported in Tables 6 to 8 which have the same 
structure as that of Table 5, since the methodological design is the same as that we 
followed and discussed with panel # 1.  
Tables 6-8 here 
                                                 
22  The estimation of a constant (steady state) inflation rate expected by the Italian households is 
statistically sounded if expected inflation is stationary in our pseudo-panels. For this, we also tested for 
unit roots in our )( 1t
h
tE   pseudo panels by using the Im et al. (2003) heterogeneous panel test. Not 
reported results further corroborate the assumption of stationary inflation expectations. This outcome is in 
accordance with the existence of a level relationship between individual expectations and consensus 
forecasts because we found the latter stationary too. 
23  For a full description, see Appendix A1.2. 
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Here again, the first-order dynamics adequately represents the data and that the 
existence of a level-relationship between individual expectations and consensus 
forecasts is always evident for all groups, irrespective of the alternative panel definition. 
Finally, the fully heterogeneous model (12) can always be restricted to the PMG model 
(13) with p-values above 0.9, and, again, constant terms cannot be restricted neither to 
zero, nor to the same value across groups within each panel. As before, the results are 
robust to the use of alternative measures of actual inflation, and do not present warnings 
about their constancy over time.  
Table 6 reports the findings for households with different educational 
backgrounds and distinguishing between males and females. As in the previous case, 
the absorption rates are highest for those who are university educated. The remaining 
households’ absorption rates are considerably lower ranging between 0.49 and 0.36. 
The steady state inflation expectations one year ahead are lowest for males who are 
university educated but their female counterparts have long-run expectations that are 
more than 1% higher. The gender difference is evident for all groups but vanishes for 
the lower educated. The simplest overreaction dynamics without overshot revision 
prevails, with exceptions for higher educated males. 
Table 7 and 8 reports the results for households based on occupation and age, 
also making gender comparisons for the various groups. Absorption rates are highest for 
the self-employed and female blue-collar workers and lowest for pensioners. It is 
unsurprising that the self-employed have the highest absorption rates. This group 
(probably more so than any of the others) have to deal with their own personal finances 
and engage in price (or wage) setting. Those aged between 50 and 64 also have higher 
absorption rates. So do males under 30. The difference between males and females are 
also pronounced, with the exception of those aged between 30 and 49.  
In the steady state solution, the amplitude of the interval for expected inflation 
one year ahead is always more or less the same (about 1-1.5%), while the two extremes 
change with individuals’ characteristics: the lower intervals (about 3.5/5.0) correspond 
to males either with a degree (see the first column in Table 6) or self-employed (see the 
first column in Table 7). Females have steady state expectations almost always above 
those of males, but the distance between males and females tend to decrease with age , 
for oldest people being virtually the same. The fully articulated overreaction dynamics 
seems to affect only the behavior of the youngest and oldest males. 
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The absorption rates of households vary considerably. In general, the higher the 
education level the higher the absorption rate of the professional forecasts, because the 
most educated group has a better understanding of inflation forecasts and a wider access 
to the mass media which report them. If the transmission of the relevant information 
takes place socially, it is likely that this group will have professional and social 
networks that are equally knowledgeable.  
The estimates also indicate significant differences between the different 
demographic groups’ long-run expectations. This is most pronounced between the 
genders. Females have considerably higher inflation expectations than their male 
counterparts. Bryan and Venkatu (2001b) found that females had higher perceptions of 
inflation than males, and they also suggest number of possible reasons why this may 
arise. Females have different shopping patterns than men, both with respect to what they 
purchase (as females are more likely to do the household shopping) and with respect to 
the frequency of their purchases. Nevertheless, these reasons remain speculative.  
Overall, there are no clear patterns for which households may overreact. The 
feature of overreaction is found across education levels, occupation and age (an 
interesting exception is blue-collar workers). Nevertheless, the lack of overreaction is 
more prevalent amongst females. In six out of the nine categories, females do not 
display behavior consistent with overreaction. Such a clear demographic distinction is 
again only found in the respective households’ expectations long-run dynamics. Female 
groups are found to have higher long-run expectations. One possible inference that can 
be made is that households with higher long-run inflation expectations tend not to 
overreact when updating their expectations. As highlighted earlier in this subsection, the 
reasons why females have higher long-run expectations remain speculative and, 
therefore, so must their reasons for not overreacting. Nevertheless, maybe it is 
unsurprising that higher long-run inflation expectations are consistent with a lack of 
overreaction when updating takes place in the short-run.     
  In an innovative recent paper Fuhrer (2012) took new approach by including 
actual survey expectations in a DSGE model found that it performed considerably better 
exhibiting strong correlations to key macroeconomic variables. Consequently, he 
proposes methods for endogenising survey expectations in general equilibrium macro 
models improving monetary policy. Clearly, this suggests greater understanding the 
nature and dynamics of survey expectations. Hence, the heterogeneity amongst different 
demographic groups and the non-monotonic convergence of expectations found in the 
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present analysis give clearer insights into how to generate better general equilibrium 
macro models and understanding actual inflation dynamics and persistence.   
4.2. Extensions with nonlinearities 
So far we have assumed the anchoring behavior of households’ inflation 
expectations to be linear. Presently we will extend the basic linear model to consider 
non-linear relationships. In the preceding empirical investigations, we were unable to 
establish any significant relationship between current inflation signals and households’ 
expectations in the long-run as found in Carroll (2003) and Lanne et al. (2009). We now 
consider whether such inflation signals are better depicted as a non-linear relationship. 
Current inflation figures together with professional forecasts enables households to 
determine the future direction, or momentum, of inflation rates and this may have an 
asymmetric effect on households’ expectations.  
The future direction — or momentum — of inflation expectations is defined as 
the difference between consensus forecasts given at time t for the next twelve months 
and the most recently available inflation rate, that is the inflation rate in t-1 It could be 
that, among the others effects, households’ expectations also account for such a change 
in direction: when the difference is positive, the future inflation rate is expected to go up 
with respect to ‘present’ values. In addition, it could also be that the perception of such 
distance depends on how clear the forecasters’ signal is to the general public, measured 
as the monthly standard error of single-institutes’ forecasts. In symbols, we can define it 
as: 
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       (14) 
which represent the standardized gap between the consensus forecast over the next year 
and the most recent known inflation rate, henceforth we will label it as simply a ‘gap’. 
Since all the professional forecasters refer their inflation predictions to the y-o-y growth 
of CPI, we computed the gap on the basis of this specific measure of actual inflation.  
In the first part of each panel of Table 9, we report the p-values of gap-
augmenting the PMG models (13) previously estimated in a linear fashion, both in 
levels and first differences. With all the four data-sets, gap-additions are never 
significant. A possible explanation for such lack of significance is that the ‘gap effect’ 
enters in a nonlinear way into our relationship, rather than being linear. 
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For this reason, we extended the linear PMG model (13) with nonlinear effects 
driven by the Heaviside indicator function It , which is based on the sign of the gap 
variable defined by equation (14) 
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where It = 1 if gapt-1 < 0 and   It = 0 if gapt-1  0. In this context, a positive gap (i.e. 
consensus predicts inflation to go up during the next year) implies that households’ 
long-run reactivity to such consensus is )(
5
1 F
tse
  , with a speed of adjustment equal 
to h P2 . While a negative gap (when future inflation is expected to go down) implies a 
long-run reactivity equal to )( 651 F
tse
  , with a speed of adjustment equal to 
)( 22
h
N
h
P   .24 
Given that not all the parameters measuring the nonlinear extensions from model 
(13) to model (15) are significant, after a number of tests (reported in Table 9) we 
define the following data congruent model that embodies a number of not rejected 
restrictions: 
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The additional restrictions (and in particular 065   ) suggest that long-run 
anchoring of household inflation expectations to consensus remains the same, that is 
F
tse
5
1
   when the gap is positive.25 When gaps are negative it simplifies to 1 . The 
absorption rates remain the same as before. The results in Table 9 unambiguously 
suggest that both N2  and 5 are 0 . Positive gaps are associated with a higher long-
run anchoring of households’ expectations to consensus ( 05  ) and faster absorption 
( 02 N ). The absorption rates of all households increases during periods when 
consensus inflation expectations are greater than the latest inflation rates. Indeed, the 
                                                 
24  In our sample 
F
tse  is in the 0.07/0.53 range, with an average of 0.22. 
25  We estimated the long-run effects of consensus on inflation expectations at the average value of 
F
tse . 
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female self-employed absorb perfectly during these periods, while the female blue-
collar and ‘other’ male are close to perfect absorption. The relative weights (or ratio) 
placed on professional forecasts are also higher during these periods. Also note that the 
consensus long-run effect when the gap is positive )(
5
1 F
tse
   is higher. For example, 
the homogeneous long-run effect reported in Table 9 (panel #1) is estimated at average 
F
tse  (0.22) and it is equal to 6.02, while a larger 1Ftse  would drop the estimate above 
to 3.87.  
Table 9 here  
 Broadly, the overreaction dynamics found in the nonlinear extensions mimics 
the linear specification. The exceptions are the university educated (those who are not in 
work and females), elementary education and those over the age of 64 (both genders). 
Regardless whether overreaction exists, there is no asymmetry between the two 
regimes. On the other hand, there is some asymmetric revision to overreaction. Revision 
is more likely when the gap is negative, that is when inflation is expected to have less 
momentum.   
Overall, among different panels of data (whose pseudo-individuals are defined 
in alternative ways) the long-run parameter (homogeneous) estimates in Table 9 are 
remarkably similar, reinforcing the poolability test outcomes and suggesting a 
population where a number of parameters are constant across individuals.  
If consensus forecasts and actual inflation rate converge to the same steady state 
solution, the gap goes to zero, and the formulation for the steady state expected inflation 
depicted in equation (10) is once again valid here. It is noteworthy that the last two lines 
of each panel in Table 9 indicate that the inclusion of nonlinear effects, which vanishes 
in the long run under the assumption of the unbiasedness of the consensus forecasts, 
lowers the steady state level of households’ expected inflation over the next year. 
Nevertheless, it is still permanently above the steady state consensus inflation forecast 
solution. 
Another important aspect of the present analyses is to investigate the nonlinear 
behavior of households when forming inflation expectations. Similar to Carroll (2003) 
and Lanne et al. (2009), we consider the role of current inflation rates. Unlike previous 
research, we consider the nonlinear impact of current inflation signals. We find that 
inflation signals are important to households as they are interested in the future direction 
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of inflation rates, that is its momentum. Indeed, they respond asymmetrically. All 
households’ absorption rates and their reactivity to consensus forecasts increase 
considerably during periods when the consensus for future inflation is higher than the 
present one. Akerlof et al. (1996; 2000) argue that households are more concerned about 
rising inflation as this would be more costly to them, because rising inflation usually 
leads to a fall in real wages. The state-varying nature of household inflation 
expectations better explain the how households update their expectations and 
inattentiveness which, inevitably, transpires into the dynamics of actual inflation.  
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks	
The main purpose of the present paper is to consider a number of key issues 
relating to how households form their inflation expectations. While how households 
form their inflation expectations has increasingly received recent attention, the present 
analysis in considering their ‘anchoring’ behavior brings together two important strands 
of the existing literature — ‘inattentiveness’ or the epidemiological version of the 
‘sticky information expectation’ and the ‘anchoring’ on inflation targets. We empirical 
assess potentially competing issues. Using novel consumer-based survey data we are 
also able to consider the demographic nature of individuals ‘anchoring’ behavior when 
forming their inflation expectations.  
The novel dataset has been used to estimate a new model encompassing both the 
anchoring approach, derived as part the long-run dynamics, and the Carroll 
epidemiological absorption mechanism in the short run. The empirical analyses consider 
key competing theories and propositions relating to households forming inflation 
expectations. Specifically, their ‘anchoring’ and ‘absorption’ behavior and how this can 
vary demographically. As highlighted in the introductory section, the present analysis 
considers two strands in the literature: the role of central bank inflation targeting and 
non-expert inattentiveness as they learn from experts.  
Importantly, the dataset enables us to consider household expectations formation 
distinguishing between the aggregate and disaggregate approach. The issue of 
heterogeneity and disagreement amongst professional forecasts have received 
considerable attention recently. Likewise households vary when they form their 
respective inflation expectations. Hence, the present analyses show that the aggregate 
approach captures inadequately how households update their inflation expectations. The 
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estimated aggregate dynamics find that the households’ absorption rate is around 0.3 
(Table 2), while the disaggregate dynamics reported in Table 4 indicate that they vary 
widely between 0.31 and 0.79. Indeed, the estimated steady state solution following 
equation (10) vary too. The estimated aggregate dynamics give a value between 5 and 
6% and between 4 and 6.5% for the demographic groups. Nevertheless, the various 
demographic groups, similar to the aggregate dynamics, overreact and display no 
significant change or structural break.  
 The results clearly indicate that Italian households are excessively sensitive to 
their perception of current inflation rates. While the long-run dynamics indicate they 
anchor their expectations on professional forecasts. Interestingly, while the long-run 
professional inflation expectations approximate the ECB targets, the household long-run 
expectations are considerably higher26. Households tend to set their expectations to that 
of the professional forecasts but at a ratio greater than one. These results are consistent 
with those found by Coibion and Gorodnichencko (2010) and Dovern et al (2012), 
which focuses on professional forecasters, where central bank independence affect 
‘anchoring’ and ‘inattentive’ behaviour but not explicit inflation targeting.  
The present paper also investigates the important but little explored issue of 
households’ overreaction when updating and forming their inflation expectations. The 
empirical findings suggest that most households tend to overreact as they update their 
inflation expectations. Also, when they overreact they rarely revise their expectations, 
the only exceptions are the households of the university educated and those that fall in 
the youngest and oldest age category under consideration. By and large, the nonlinear 
estimates mimic the linear ones. No asymmetric overreaction was found in either 
regime. Hence, households that have overreactions do not distinguish between periods 
when they expect inflation to have an upward or downward momentum. Conversely, a 
number of these overreacting households tend to revise their expectations in periods 
where they expect inflation to have lower momentum.  
The finding that inflation expectations are higher than actual inflation has 
already been documented in the literature for the US (van der Klauw et al., 2008). In the 
case of Italy, the fact that inflation expectations are higher than actual outcomes may be 
linked to a ‘change over’ effect that started in the immediate aftermath of the adoption 
                                                 
26  According to Issing (2008), the ECB is committed to anchor inflation expectations at a level 
consistent with the mandate of maintaining price stability in the Euro area as a whole; in this sense, the 
ECB may not be particularly interested if inflation expectations exceed its definition of price stability in 
an individual country.  
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of the common currency and lasted for a long period thereafter (see also on this Del 
Giovane, Fabiani, & Sabbatini, 2009). According to Bruine de Bruine et al. (2010), 
there is also the possibility that overestimation is linked to the design of the 
questionnaire: questions on ‘price in general’ or ‘price you pay’ are found to elicit 
higher expectations than those based on questions about the ‘rate of inflation’ (and the 
EU harmonised questionnaire asks about ‘consumer prices’, which is a concept closer to 
that of ‘price in general’ than to that of ‘rate of inflation’).  
An interesting paradoxical finding is that households undertake the fairly costly 
action of ‘anchoring’ on professional forecasters in the long run, while professional 
long-run forecasts tend toward the ECB medium-term inflation target. However, is this 
a reflection on the ECB’s credibility? Further research on this is however advisable in 
the future, possibly extending the analysis to other Euro area countries, exposed to the 
same changeover shock, but with a different tradition in the conduct of monetary 
policies.  
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Appendix A1: Households Inflation Expectations Over-reaction and Revision: 
Definition and Tests 
Starting with equation (5), where we assume for simplicity that 032    
(i.e. we exclude the role of actual and perceived inflation in the long run, as also 
emerges from our empirical application), we can re-write the model in terms of 
households’ and forecasters’ expected inflation levels as follows: 
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and also if the long-run effect of forecasters’ predictions on households’ inflation 
expectations is one ( 11  ), we have in equation (A.2) is a slightly more complex 
version of the Carroll epidemiological model (denoted by equation (1) in the main text) 
because of t
T
t
hP
ttu    42113,12 , i.e. the presence in ut of effects 
due to short-run fluctuations/changes in the perceived and actual inflation, and a 
constant term related to anchoring on the Central Bank target. 
If we write equation (A.1) in order to explicit 2 , i.e. the share of households 
informed by professional forecasters, we have that; 27  
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For ease of comparison with Carroll’s epidemiological model as depicted by equation 
(1), we can denote the absorption rate as 2  , and re-write equation (A.3) as: 
                                                 
27  Being )1( 2  the share of uninformed people (i.e. not following professional forecasts in real 
time; remember that convergent dynamics requires that 02  ), the higher the speed of adjustment in the 
EC model (A.1), the higher the absorption rate. 
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again, if 
1
11
2 
   and 11  , equation (A.4) collapses to Carroll’s in equation (1), 
apart from the ut term (which basically captures the short-run dynamics). 
A1.1 - Two examples from the applied literature 
In Carroll (2003), we have that 3.0112   and 11  , therefore 
model (A.4) is: 
tt
h
tt
F
tt
F
tt
h
t uEEEE ˆ)(7.0)(13.0
3.0)(
3.0
3.03.0)( 1111 

 

     
while in Easaw and Golinelli (2010), for h = gp and F = be, we have that 4.02  ; 
7.011  ; and 2.11  ; therefore model (A.4) is: 
tt
h
tt
F
tt
F
tt
h
t uEEEE ˆ)(6.0)(2.14.0
7.0)(
4.0
7.04.0)( 1111 

 

     
which respectively simplify to: 
tt
h
tt
F
tt
h
t uEEE ˆ)(7.0)(3.0)( 111      
and to:  
tt
h
tt
F
tt
F
tt
h
t uEEEE ˆ)(6.0)](55.0)(75.1[4.0)( 1111     
Extending Carroll’s epidemiological model, Easaw and Golinelli (2010) estimated 
dynamics depicts a short-term overreaction of general public inflation expectations to 
business economists’ forecasts, as their point estimates 1ˆ
ˆ
2
11  

, i.e. 211 ˆˆ    and 
1
2
11 ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 
  . However, as investigating overreaction was beyond the scope of the paper, 
they did not formally test for restrictions in the population. 
 
  39
A1.2 - A general statement 
Starting from our equation (4) and given the restrictions supported by our 
empirical outcomes that 032    (i.e. that the steady state household expectations 
are only driven by professional forecasts, see equation A.1), we have expectations made 
by informed households overreacting to professional forecasts in t for t+1 (in short, 
‘overreaction to the news in t’) if the null hypothesis: Ho: 211    is rejected against 
the alternative H1: 211   . Concurrently, the same households adjust their 
overreaction on the basis of the past month’s professional forecasts in t-1 for t 
(‘overreaction revision through the news in t-1’) if the null hypothesis: Ho 1
2
11 
   is 
rejected against the alternative H1: 1
2
11 
  .  
These tests can be easily computed as combinations of equation (4) parameter 
estimates. Under the assumptions of overreaction ( 211   ) and positive 1 , the 
overreaction revision is in absolute value smaller than the overreaction and, as soon as 
1  goes beyond one, the overshot revision reverts to zero (when 1
2
11 
  ).28  
Appendix A2: Consensus inflation forecast estimate and analysis 
A2.1 - Estimation.  
Since 1999, we collected the annual forecasts of the inflation rate — denoted as: 
ht
F
rt pE ,  and measured on the basis of the monthly consumer price index, CPI — for the 
current year (partially known at the time the forecast is made) and for the following year 
(i.e. h = 0, 1) of five different forecast institutes F, i.e. professional forecasters.29 Such 
forecasts are reported and largely commented in the press at month r of year t in which 
                                                 
28   For even larger 1  estimates (i.e. when 1211   ), the overshot revision becomes a 
further overreaction based on past professional forecasts  
29  The five professional forecasters are three Italian institutes (Ricerche per l’Economia e la 
Finanza, Associazione Prometeia per le Previsioni Econometriche, and Istituto di Studi e Analisi 
Economica), and two international organizations (IMF’s World Economic Outlook, and OECD’s 
Economic Outlook). They are respectively labeled as F = ref, pro, isae, weo, and eco. 
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they are published.30 In this way, the institutes’ forecasts are (intermittently) published 
only for some months r of each year t, while the ISAE household survey is regularly 
conducted each month m.  
 In order to obtain monthly series of professional forecasts, in the month when 
the forecast of the Fth institute is published (i.e. m = r), we assume that the inflation 
forecast over the next twelve months is given by the weighted average of current- and 
next-year inflation forecasts:  
1,,1 1212
12)(   tfrttfrttFt pEmpEmE  .  
The two weights for t and t+1 forecasts are respectively proportional to the number of 
months from m to the end of the current year, and to the remaining months of the 
following year. If in the following month the Fth institute does not publish a new 
forecast, the F monthly prediction in m+1 is assumed to be equal to the most recent 
forecasts for t and t+1 ( ht
F
rt pE , ) averaged with updated weights: 12
112 m
 and 12
1m
 
; note that weights always sum to one.  
Though the five forecasts broadly tend to follow a similar path over time, over 
the sample period there are more ‘noisy’ periods in which the professional forecasters 
tend to disagree to a larger extent.  
In order to compute a monthly consensus series, we take the average of the five 
institutes’ forecasts, and we define the series of the monthly standard deviation of the 
five forecasts as the ‘noise’ that might mix up the forecast signal.  
The time series of the consensus inflation forecasts witnesses a rapid increase 
from the end of 2007 to the first half of 2008, then rapidly drops to about 1% during 
2009. Regarding noise, we note that the institutes’ disagreements peaked during the last 
period of the sample, i.e. when the inflation forecasts started to move away from the 2-
2.3% range typical of the first part of the sample. 
 
  
                                                 
30  With few exceptions, ref and pro publish their forecasts four times per year (i.e. r = January or 
February, April or May, September or October, and December), while the other three institutes report the 
inflation forecasts twice per year: r = February and May for isae, r = April and October for weo, and r = 
June and December for eco. 
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A2.2 - Test for consensus bias and weak form of informational efficiency.  
If we denote 12-months ahead inflation consensus forecasts in t as yt+12|t  , and 
the corresponding actual inflation realizations as yt+12 , tests of consensus rationality can 
be based on the regression equation: 
yt+12 =  +  yt+12|t + t+12   
where H0:  =0,  =1 entails unbiasedness/weak rationality. A consistent estimate of 
the covariance matrix of  and  parameters is given by Newey and West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected (HAC) standard errors.  
Alternatively, as noted in Holden and Peel (1990), another way to test for 
unbiasedness is via the test H0:  =0 in the regression: 
et+12|t = yt+12 –  yt+12|t  =  + t+12  
Regression results clearly stress the unbiasedness/weak rationality of our consensus 
series (with H0 p-values which are always above 15%). This outcome is robust to the 
use of alternative measures of inflation (either y-o-y or annualized m-o-m rates of 
growth computed from either the Italian index of consumer prices or the Italian HICP, 
both series are released by the Italian National Statistics Agency), to the model on 
which inferences are based (see above), and to the use of HAC or bootstrapped standard 
errors. Details are available upon request. 
A2.3 - Consensus univariate representation.  
If consensus inflation forecasts can be represented by the stationary p-order 
auto-regressive model: t
p
k
kt
F
ktkt
F
t EE   


1
101 )()(  , they collapse to 
the long-run steady state scalar solution: )1/()(
1
0
* 


p
k
k
FE  .  
In order to test for stationarity of the )( 1t
F
tE  univariate representation, we 
used both informal (time plots, correlogram) and formal (various unit root/stationarity 
tests) techniques. Given that all results pointed to consensus series stationarity, we 
estimated over the 2002m6-2010m12 period the best univariate model for consensus 
forecasts as the following restricted AR(5) representation (standard errors in brackets): 
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 )( 1tFtE  0.145 + 1.087  )(1 tFtE  0.163  )( 45 tFtE  tˆ  
          (0.050)  (0.035)                  (0.036) 
where, on the basis of a number of misspecification tests, residuals tˆ  are a valid 
representation of a normal white noise process. On the basis of these estimates, the 
steady state solution of consensus is )( *FE  1.924, and the corresponding 95% 
confidence interval ranges between 1.705 and 2.142, which denotes professional 
forecasts for Italy which are broadly consistent with the ECB 2% reference rate for the 
whole Euro area inflation. 
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Tab. 1  
Expected inflation: sample composition and statistics by selected characteristics 
# obs. % share mean std. dev. % points deviation from 
reference group a, b 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) c  (6) d 
Employment  
   
- self-employed 11398 8.8 4.4 10.6 -1.058 *** -1.002 ***
- white collar 32715 25.3 5.4 11.9    
- blue collar 12859 10.0 6.3 13.7 0.527 *** 0.519 ***
- pensioner 36448 28.2 4.7 11.2 0.152  0.216 * 
- other e 35792 27.7 5.9 13.5 0.264 ** 0.284 **
Education     
- university 13653 10.6 4.7 10.6 -0.378 *** -0.256 **
- upper-secondary 50697 39.2 5.3 12.0    
- lower-secondary 39510 30.6 5.7 12.8 0.591 *** 0.564 ***
- elementary 25352 19.6 5.3 12.7 0.918 *** 0.877 ***
Gender     
- male 64527 49.9 5.0 11.4    
- female 64685 50.1 5.7 13.0 0.463 *** 0.487 ***
Age     
- < 30 11998 9.3 6.1 13.9 0.167  0.064  
- 30 – 49 44700 34.6 5.8 12.8    
- 50 – 64 37639 29.1 5.3 12.1 -0.759 *** -0.658 ***
- > 64 34875 27.0 4.6 11.0 -1.898 *** -1.664 ***
Full sample 129212 100.0 5.4 12.3 5.452 *** 5.424 *** 
(a) The reference group is: white-collar employee, upper-secondary educated, male, and aged 30-49. 
(b) *** and ** respectively denote 1% and 5% significant differences. Parameters’ standard errors are 
robust to heteroschedasticity, see White (1980). 
(c) OLS estimates of αk in the model: hthtktht kDE   )()( 01  , where α0 is the average 
expected inflation rate for the reference group (equal to 5.452, as shown in the last row of column 5), 
and αk are the deviations to α0 due to the k individual characteristics listed along the rows (measured 
by the k dummy variables D(k) ).  
(d) OLS estimates of αk in the model: hthtktttht kDE   )()( 1 , where previous intercept α0 
is substituted by the time effects αt (whose average over time estimate is 5.424, as shown in the last 
row of column 6) multiplied by t  which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in t, 
zero otherwise.  
(e) Unemployed, student or housewife.  
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Tab. 2 
Main outcomes from estimating three alternative models for repeated cross-sections 
 Model with: a  
 only individual 
characteristics 
 
plus time effects 
plus perceived 
inflation, consensus, 
and interactions 
P-values of joint zero restrictions to: b  
all individual characteristics 
i.e. kk  0  
of which: ck   , and c = 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 
- employment 0.0000 0.0000 0.1533 
- education 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 
- gender 0.0000 0.0000 0.0709 
- age 0.0000 0.0000 0.2100 
all time effects, i.e. tt  0  0.0000 0.0000 
interaction of individual characteristics with 
perceived inflation, overall i.e. 
kPkP  0  
of which: ck   , and c = 
  0.0000 
- employment   0.0000 
- education   0.0349 
- gender   0.2837 
- age   0.0128 
consensus forecast, overall  
i.e. kFkF  0  
 
of which: ck   , and c = 
  0.0000 
- employment   0.0338 
- education   0.0000 
- gender   0.1273 
- age   0.4804 
    
R2 0.0049 0.1837 0.2994 
# of parameters 12 104 128 
(a) Model (5) results in the first column are the same as those reported in column (5) of Table 1; model (6) 
results in the second column are the same as those reported in column (6) of Table 1. The third column 
reports results from model (7), which is: 
    httFthtFkhPthtPk t
F
tF
hP
tP
h
tkttt
h
t
EkDkD
EkDE






)()()(
)()()(
1
,
1
,
1
. 
(b) Inferences are robust to heteroskedasticity, see White (1980). 
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Tab 3 
Dynamic modelling of average households expectations (T=92) a 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2.1677 3.1542 2.8565 2.8825 2.7312 
 1.114 1.125 0.997 0.990 0.971 
 
 
1.95 2.80 2.87 2.91 2.81 
 0.2006 0.2073 0.2052 0.2015 0.2032 
 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 
 
 
4.49 4.58 4.58 4.60 4.65 
 0.0087 -0.0996    
 0.048 0.413    
 
 
0.18 -0.24    
 -0.3200 -0.3218 -0.3117 -0.3055 -0.2824 
 0.072 0.075 0.072 0.071 0.065 
 
 
-4.44 -4.28 -4.31 -4.33 -4.38 
 2.8094 2.1066 3.1869 3.5405 2.8630 
 1.120 1.269 1.124 0.795 0.154 
 
 
2.51 1.66 2.83 4.45 18.58 
 0.0192 0.0129 0.0215   
 0.047 0.048 0.048   
 
 
0.41 0.27 0.45   
 0.2869 0.6267    
 0.206 0.817    
 
 
1.39 0.77    
 -0.9187 -0.1897 -1.0978 -1.3724  
 1.648 2.121 1.690 1.585  
 -0.56 -0.09 -0.65 -0.87  
R2 0.38291 0.36730 0.361 0.359 0.355 
RMSE 0.82415 0.83451 0.829 0.825 0.824 
Testing for the absence of  b 
- overreaction 0.034 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.011 
- overshot revision 0.268 0.062 0.091 0.099 0.072 
Long-run solution of expected inflation c, 
- upper-bound   6.20 6.13 
- lower bound  4.67 4.89 
(a) Model specification: 
t
T
t
MP
tt
F
tt
M
t
t
MP
tt
F
tt
M
t
EE
EE






])()([
)()(
423
,
121112
113
,
121111
 
where regressors respectively measure changes in: professional forecasts, perceived and 
actual inflation rates; lagged levels of: average households expectations, professional 
forecasts, perceived and actual inflation rates; standard errors are below each estimate and, 
below standard errors, the t-statistics. In column (1) the actual inflation rate is measured by 
the annualised m-o-m growth of CPI, in column (2) by the y-o-y growth of HICP.  
(b) P-values of Ho: 211    , and Ho: 1211    respectively. 
(c) Defined as: 
TFM EE  4*1* )()(   ; the consensus 95% confidence interval goes 
from 1.7% to 2.1%. 
11
12
13
2
1
2
3
T4
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Tab 4 
Alternative group definitions a 
 Male Female Working Not working 
         panel # 2 panel # 1 
University 1 (5.1) 2 (4.4) 1 (6.8) 2 (2.7) 
Upper-secondary 3 (19.2) 4 (16.9) 3 (21.7) 4 (14.4) 
Lower-secondary 5 (15.3) 6 (15.3) 5 (10.6) 6 (20.0) 
Elementary 7 (8.4) 8 (15.5) 7 (23.9) 
         panel # 3   
Self-employed 1 (5.8) 2 (2.3)   
White collar 3 (12.7) 4 (10.2)   
Blue collar 5 (6.5) 6 (3.2)   
Pensioner 7 (18.6) 8 (12.1)   
Other b 9 (4.4) 10 (24.4)   
         panel # 4   
Age < 30 1 (4.4) 5 (3.7)   
30 – 49 2 (15.4) 6 (16.6)   
50 – 64 3 (14.0) 7 (14.9)   
> 64 4 (14.3) 8 (16.8)   
(a) For each panel, the number that labels each group is reported together with, in brackets, the % 
frequency of the group on the total surveyed people. The sum of % frequencies by panel may be not 
exactly equal to 100 for rounding effects.  
(b) Unemployed, student or housewife. 
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Tab 5 - Main estimation results, pseudo panel # 1 a 
groups: a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Unrestricted model b         
h
2  -0.6643 -0.8032 -0.4345 -0.5341 -0.6178 -0.3249 -0.3291
   t -7.13 -7.71 -5.03 -5.64 -6.31 -4.18 -4.27
chh 032    0.2955 0.2201 0.0355 0.1502 0.4904 0.7906 0.78500.2989 0.3394 0.5424 0.1484 0.9068 0.2729 0.9389
ch 013   0.6530 0.8533 0.0752 0.7057 0.4005 0.1963 0.31610.9551 0.2055 0.3738 0.2894 0.7460 0.0650 0.0284
chhh 03213    0.1206 0.1568 0.0788 0.2676 0.1238 0.6044 0.5221
0.4041 0.3642 0.6533 0.2471 0.9211 0.2220 0.0515
Restricted model        
h
11  5.5517 4.6485 2.0755 4.6952 4.8189 3.4988 3.7012
   t 3.77 1.77 1.52 3.33 2.63 2.54 2.68
h
12  0.2066 0.2201 0.2372 0.1028 0.1621 0.2069 0.1281
   t 5.46 4.83 5.34 2.12 3.25 4.17 3.42
h
2  -0.6573 -0.7929 -0.3828 -0.4888 -0.6322 -0.3301 -0.3176
   t -6.99 -7.60 -4.49 -5.31 -6.47 -4.33 -4.30
h
1  2.8307 3.0840 3.5932 3.4826 4.1416 4.2942 3.9917
   t 5.30 3.91 4.29 4.97 5.95 4.21 3.68
Th4  d -0.5312 -1.2939 -1.6324 -1.4187 -2.1652 -2.6008 -2.2547
   t -0.50 -0.82 -0.98 -1.02 -1.56 -1.28 -1.05
R2 0.5285 0.5725 0.4053 0.3065 0.4043 0.3947 0.3182
Andrews break  e 0.0440 0.4977 0.1059 0.2340 0.0295 0.0812 0.2824
Chow break  e 0.0953 0.2252 0.2646 0.6550 0.0657 0.0621 0.2775
11  h  0.7286       
PMG model        
h
11  5.7210 4.7702 2.0290 4.6832 4.5122 3.3527 3.6159
   t 3.98 1.88 1.55 3.45 2.55 2.52 2.70
h
12  0.2058 0.2203 0.2376 0.1029 0.1638 0.2106 0.1292
   t 5.55 4.97 5.51 2.18 3.35 4.36 3.55
h
2  -0.6567 -0.7929 -0.3792 -0.4880 -0.6077 -0.3123 -0.3106
   t -7.12 -7.80 -4.70 -5.51 -6.55 -4.37 -4.40
1  3.4425 3.4425 3.4425 3.4425 3.4425 3.4425 3.4425
   t 12.21 12.21 12.21 12.21 12.21 12.21 12.21
Th4   e -1.7268 -1.9943 -1.3376 -1.3403 -0.7965 -0.9308 -1.1804
   t -2.96 -3.23 -2.14 -2.22 -1.31 -1.38 -1.74
Testing for the absence of  f 
- overreaction 0.0000 0.0477 0.0967 0.0008 0.0093 0.0269 0.0198
- overshot revision 0.0117 0.3973 0.5537 0.0312 0.1641 0.1337 0.1012
Long-run interval: g      
- upper-bound 5.64 5.37 6.03 6.03 6.57 6.44 6.19
- lower-bound 4.15 3.89 4.54 4.54 5.08 4.95 4.70
(a) The group definition of panel # 1 is in Table 4. 
(b) Maximum likelihood estimates (below, Student-t statistics) of the unrestricted model: 
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t EEEE    ])()([)()( 423,121112113,121111
Then, p-values are reported for each restriction and the following estimates embody such restrictions. 
(c) For each restriction, p-values are reported from models measuring actual inflation with CPI and HICP. 
(d) Obtained as a ratio of PMG parameters’ estimates: 
hh
210 /   . 
(e) Andrews (1993) and Chow (1960, with exogenous date in 2007m8) tests for parameters break (p-val). 
(f) P-values of Ho: 
hh
211   , and Ho: 1211   hh  respectively; see also Appendix A1.2. 
(g) Interval estimation of inflation expectations (steady state of the model with unconstrained intercepts). 
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Tab 6 - Main estimation results, pseudo panel # 2 a  
groups: a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Unrestricted model b   
h
2  -0.7533 -0.7591 -0.4926 -0.5245 -0.4851 -0.4358 -0.5075 -0.3761
   t -7.87 -7.27 -5.85 -5.48 -5.43 -4.98 -5.35 -4.54
chh 032    0.1425 0.2272 0.0241 0.2384 0.8901 0.5852 0.4740 0.70840.3465 0.5431 0.2192 0.3519 0.5349 0.2466 0.5391 0.9058
ch 013   0.5418 0.8690 0.2155 0.1827 0.7592 0.4115 0.7499 0.24030.8948 0.6736 0.1849 0.3795 0.4337 0.3472 0.8483 0.0236
chhh 03213    0.0165 0.3014 0.0547 0.3484 0.8452 0.7648 0.6818 0.4173
0.4398 0.6872 0.2861 0.5095 0.7069 0.4051 0.7325 0.0588
Restricted model    
h
11  6.9589 3.7728 2.6051 3.8674 4.8003 2.7543 3.8535 3.9206
   t 4.21 1.80 2.00 2.64 3.12 1.81 2.16 2.31
h
12  0.1793 0.1771 0.3024 0.1530 0.2183 0.1526 0.0691 0.1137
   t 3.61 3.84 5.80 3.68 3.73 3.46 1.86 2.89
h
2  -0.7471 -0.7405 -0.4236 -0.5012 -0.4805 -0.4339 -0.4813 -0.3657
   t -7.62 -7.15 -5.22 -5.32 -5.50 -5.06 -5.30 -4.58
h
1  2.5977 3.2896 3.5015 3.7303 4.3175 4.3298 4.2481 4.0537
   t 5.02 4.77 4.75 5.44 5.50 5.04 4.57 3.54
Th4  d -0.6983 -0.9222 -1.9467 -1.2916 -2.7729 -2.4102 -2.6362 -2.4800
   t -0.68 -0.67 -1.33 -0.95 -1.77 -1.41 -1.43 -1.09
R2 0.4866 0.4830 0.4513 0.3597 0.4188 0.3519 0.2850 0.3096
Andrews break  e 0.0553 0.1114 0.4244 0.0896 0.0437 0.1442 0.0633 0.6144
Chow break  e 0.0438 0.4191 0.3912 0.2986 0.1569 0.5261 0.1656 0.0943
11  h  0.5033   
PMG model    
h
11  7.1565 3.8481 2.6079 3.7850 4.5828 2.5509 3.6698 3.8269
   t 4.38 1.89 2.08 2.70 3.08 1.73 2.12 2.33
h
12  0.1784 0.1768 0.3024 0.1535 0.2221 0.1554 0.0704 0.1147
   t 3.63 3.94 5.97 3.80 3.88 3.62 1.94 3.00
h
2  -0.7322 -0.7414 -0.4238 -0.4949 -0.4564 -0.4131 -0.4672 -0.3603
   t -7.57 -7.36 -5.44 -5.51 -5.54 -5.10 -5.37 -4.68
1  3.5115 3.5115 3.5115 3.5115 3.5115 3.5115 3.5115 3.5115
   t 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39 13.39
Th4   d -2.4824 -1.3557 -1.9662 -0.8633 -1.1920 -0.8091 -1.1972 -1.4195
   t -4.55 -2.39 -3.42 -1.52 -2.01 -1.34 -1.95 -2.16
Testing for the absence of  f 
- overreaction 0.0000 0.0493 0.0297 0.0044 0.0051 0.0908 0.0408 0.0365
- overshot revision 0.0027 0.5251 0.3509 0.1246 0.0694 0.4664 0.2588 0.1619
Long-run interval: g         
- upper-bound 5.03 6.16 5.55 6.65 6.32 6.71 6.32 6.10
- lower-bound 3.51 4.64 4.03 5.13 4.81 5.19 4.80 4.58
(a) The group definition of panel # 2 is in Table 4. 
(b) Maximum likelihood estimates (below, Student-t statistics) of the unrestricted model: 
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Then, p-values are reported for each restriction and the following estimates embody such restrictions. 
(c) For each restriction, p-values are reported from models measuring actual inflation with CPI and HICP. 
(d) Obtained as a ratio of PMG parameters’ estimates: 
hh
210 /   . 
(e) Andrews (1993) and Chow (1960, with exogenous date in 2007m8) tests for parameters break (p-val). 
(f) P-values of Ho: 
hh
211   , and Ho: 1211   hh  respectively; see also Appendix A1.2. 
(g) Interval estimation of inflation expectations (steady state of the model with unconstrained intercepts). 
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Tab 8 - Main estimation results, pseudo panel # 4 a 
groups: a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Unrestricted model b   
h
2  -0.7019 -0.5715 -0.4854 -0.4648 -0.8058 -0.6283 -0.4469 -0.2541
   t -7.44 -6.27 -5.41 -5.08 -7.8 -6.3 -5.21 -3.59
chh 032    0.1898 0.0841 0.1392 0.6558 0.5487 0.7005 0.4353 0.66500.3241 0.7123 0.2426 0.5512 0.2185 0.7152 0.5053 0.8478
ch 013   0.5627 0.4181 0.7619 0.8649 0.9308 0.2597 0.5410 0.31970.5185 0.9254 0.2359 0.5502 0.2564 0.6769 0.6107 0.1802
chhh 03213    0.0601 0.1370 0.0802 0.8373 0.5987 0.7267 0.6422 0.3230
0.5154 0.8451 0.3363 0.7285 0.2446 0.8761 0.4905 0.3991
Restricted model    
h
11  9.6576 4.0616 1.7330 5.4828 4.2562 5.5953 3.0420 0.9736
   t 4.36 2.78 1.14 3.86 1.44 3.67 2.07 0.73
h
12  0.1925 0.3069 0.2305 0.0520 0.1944 0.1110 0.1792 0.1545
   t 3.66 5.64 4.36 1.01 3.43 2.75 4.05 4.37
h
2  -0.6785 -0.5257 -0.4467 -0.4494 -0.8041 -0.6343 -0.4230 -0.2473
   t -7.07 -5.88 -5.16 -5.07 -7.84 -6.48 -5.15 -3.63
h
1  3.9914 3.7621 3.3530 4.0175 4.2977 3.9555 3.7557 3.5834
   t 5.13 5.92 4.02 5.09 4.66 6.87 4.43 2.65
Th4  d -2.2440 -1.9383 -1.4134 -3.0355 -1.3425 -1.3329 -1.5389 -2.1898
   t -1.45 -1.53 -0.85 -1.93 -0.73 -1.16 -0.91 -0.82
R2 0.4837 0.4915 0.3754 0.3434 0.5128 0.4037 0.3518 0.3029
Andrews break  e 0.1356 0.0385 0.4532 0.1230 0.0716 0.0638 0.6840 0.2634
Chow break  e 0.0581 0.0584 0.6905 0.1994 0.0414 0.1355 0.5717 0.3925
11  h  0.9972   
PMG model    
h
11  9.5964 4.0938 1.8423 5.4506 4.0996 5.5553 3.0649 1.0042
   t 4.50 2.90 1.26 3.97 1.44 3.78 2.16 0.78
h
12  0.1927 0.3069 0.2287 0.0526 0.1949 0.1113 0.1790 0.1541
   t 3.77 5.80 4.44 1.05 3.54 2.83 4.17 4.49
h
2  -0.6755 -0.5274 -0.4485 -0.4482 -0.8012 -0.6315 -0.4240 -0.2476
   t -7.34 -6.11 -5.32 -5.21 -8.04 -6.71 -5.33 -3.74
1  3.8579 3.8579 3.8579 3.8579 3.8579 3.8579 3.8579 3.8579
   t 14.46 14.46 14.46 14.46 14.46 14.46 14.46 14.46
Th4   d -1.9827 -2.1258 -2.4003 -2.7233 -0.4829 -1.1419 -1.7389 -2.7265
   t -3.36 -3.74 -4.01 -4.59 -0.78 -2.04 -2.89 -3.85
Testing for the absence of  f 
- overreaction 0.0000 0.0016 0.1949 0.0020 0.1538 0.0002 0.0314 0.4348
- overshot revision 0.0009 0.1138 0.9371 0.0354 0.7258 0.0342 0.3160 0.9695
Long-run interval: g         
- upper-bound 6.27 6.13 5.86 5.53 7.77 7.11 6.52 5.53
- lower-bound 4.61 4.46 4.19 3.87 6.11 5.45 4.85 3.86
(a) The group definition of panel # 4 is in Table 4. 
(b) Maximum likelihood estimates (below, Student-t statistics) of the unrestricted model: 
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Then, p-values are reported for each restriction and the following estimates embody such restrictions. 
(c) For each restriction, p-values are reported from models measuring actual inflation with CPI and HICP. 
(d) Obtained as a ratio of PMG parameters’ estimates: 
hh
210 /   . 
(e) Andrews (1993) and Chow (1960, with exogenous date in 2007m8) tests for parameters break (p-val). 
(f) P-values of Ho: 
hh
211   , and Ho: 1211   hh  respectively; see also Appendix A1.2. 
(g) Interval estimation of inflation expectations (steady state of the model with unconstrained intercepts).
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Tab 7 
Main estimation results, pseudo panel # 3 a  
groups: a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unrestricted model (8) 
h
2  -0.6252 -0.8424 -0.5084 -0.5791 -0.4438 -0.8458 -0.4375 -0.3180 -0.8072 -0.4557
   t -5.93 -8.01 -5.67 -6.02 -5.02 -7.54 -5.07 -4.05 -8.44 -5.11
chh 032    0.1299 0.3836 0.1287 0.2333 0.4110 0.6478 0.4878 0.7079 0.1552 0.56890.6130 0.4222 0.1017 0.7756 0.6277 0.0925 0.4682 0.8182 0.2989 0.2818
ch 013   0.3720 0.2107 0.8001 0.4338 0.1880 0.9205 0.6479 0.6981 0.9975 0.33380.9801 0.2822 0.1578 0.8887 0.4168 0.6520 0.9802 0.1965 0.2497 0.7468
chhh 03213    0.0139 0.1640 0.1673 0.3910 0.4824 0.8130 0.4903 0.7839 0.1907 0.7025
0.7980 0.4228 0.1719 0.8913 0.7056 0.1771 0.6478 0.4956 0.3477 0.4514
Restricted model 
h
11  3.5152 1.9072 3.6668 4.9156 2.0794 3.4645 4.4004 1.7649 8.2800 3.6693
   t 1.96 1.02 2.36 2.85 1.16 1.24 3.31 1.18 3.84 2.58
h
12  0.1102 0.1012 0.2755 0.1630 0.2712 0.0410 0.1745 0.1289 0.2171 0.1204
   t 2.53 2.79 5.25 3.71 6.06 0.92 3.09 3.36 4.37 2.95
h
2  -0.6483 -0.8203 -0.4597 -0.5572 -0.4059 -0.8393 -0.4115 -0.3025 -0.7609 -0.4488
   t -5.98 -8.03 -5.30 -5.85 -4.81 -7.62 -4.93 -4.06 -8.09 -5.16
h
1  3.2811 3.4540 3.3516 3.8365 3.5800 4.5663 4.1192 3.0592 3.1947 4.3332
   t 5.06 6.08 4.13 5.23 3.48 5.55 5.11 2.48 4.61 5.53
Th4  d -2.0887 -2.0869 -1.4463 -1.4173 -0.7127 -2.3523 -2.9962 -0.9352 -0.5429 -2.3871
   t -1.62 -1.85 -0.90 -0.97 -0.35 -1.44 -1.87 -0.38 -0.39 -1.53
R2 0.3565 0.4757 0.4601 0.3958 0.4623 0.4122 0.3686 0.2591 0.5705 0.3369
Andrews break  e 0.1649 0.3638 0.0464 0.0941 0.2484 0.2293 0.1043 0.4161 0.1357 0.1301
Chow break  e 0.0742 0.1359 0.4599 0.1069 0.2446 0.1777 0.0803 0.2120 0.0782 0.3027
11  h  0.9269
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PMG model 
h
11  3.6260 1.9729 3.7408 4.8393 2.0992 3.0076 4.3025 1.8435 8.4455 3.5009
   t 2.08 1.09 2.49 2.92 1.23 1.11 3.34 1.27 4.05 2.54
h
12  0.1103 0.1012 0.2751 0.1636 0.2710 0.0434 0.1771 0.1280 0.2160 0.1221
   t 2.60 2.86 5.39 3.83 6.24 1.00 3.23 3.43 4.46 3.07
h
2  -0.6498 -0.8199 -0.4626 -0.5524 -0.4069 -0.8146 -0.4015 -0.3017 -0.7636 -0.4316
   t -6.15 -8.25 -5.51 -6.07 -5.06 -7.70 -5.04 -4.16 -8.34 -5.21
1  3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437 3.6437
   t 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33 15.33
Th4   d -2.7972 -2.4575 -2.0175 -1.0400 -0.8374 -0.5487 -2.0648 -2.0777 -1.4205 -1.0390
   t -5.40 -4.85 -3.71 -1.95 -1.43 -0.99 -3.75 -3.26 -2.71 -1.90
Testing for the absence of f   
- overreaction 0.0241 0.2701 0.0100 0.0023 0.1915 0.2607 0.0047 0.2058 0.0001 0.0173
- overshot revision 0.4339 0.5710 0.1571 0.0751 0.7012 0.9882 0.0626 0.6096 0.0070 0.1906
Long-run interval:  g   
- upper-bound 5.00 5.34 5.78 6.76 6.96 7.25 5.73 5.72 6.38 6.76
- lower-bound 3.43 3.77 4.21 5.18 5.39 5.67 4.16 4.15 4.80 5.18
(a) The group definition of panel # 3 is in Table 4. 
(b) Maximum likelihood estimates (below, Student-t statistics) of the unrestricted model: 
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and the following estimates embody such restrictions. 
(c) For each restriction, p-values are reported from models measuring actual inflation with CPI and HICP. 
(d) Obtained as a ratio of PMG parameters’ estimates: 
hh
210 /   . 
(e) Andrews (1993) and Chow (1960, with exogenous date in 2007m8) tests for parameters break (p-val). 
(f) P-values of Ho: 
hh
211   , and Ho: 1211   hh  respectively; see also Appendix A1.2. 
(g) Interval estimation of inflation expectations (steady state of the model with unconstrained intercepts). 
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Tab 9 - Nonlinear modeling: main estimation results with all pseudo panels a  
 groups: a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 estimates b and tests c:  
 panel # 1  
 Extending PMG to linear gap effects d  
 - long-run pooled gap effect = 0 0.1659        
 - long- and short-run gap effects = 0 0.3815 0.3052 0.2065 0.3680 0.3519 0.2300 0.0973  
 Nonlinear gap effects PMG model e  
 - long-run asymmetry: 065    0.7883  
 - short-run gap effect: 014 h   0.4021  
 - nonlinear dynamics: Nh N 22    0.8360  
 - joint LR test of the restrictions above  0.8163  
 Restricted nonlinear PMG model f  
 h P2  -0.7524 -0.8852 -0.5073 -0.6271 -0.7913 -0.4108 -0.3900    
  -7.11 -7.81 -5.41 -6.16 -7.44 -4.74 -4.45    
 Nh P 22    -0.5682 -0.701 -0.3231 -0.4429 -0.6071 -0.2266 -0.2058    
 -5.23 -6.05 -3.33 -4.23 -5.59 -2.53 -2.23    
 511  P  g 6.0267 6.0267 6.0267 6.0267 6.0267 6.0267 6.0267    
 11.89 11.89 11.89 11.89 11.89 11.89 11.89    
 inflation effect when gap>0 =  5  h -2.7637 -2.7637 -2.7637 -2.7637 -2.7637 -2.7637 -2.7637    
 -6.3 -6.3 -6.3 -6.3 -6.3 -6.3 -6.3    
 11  N  3.2629 3.2629 3.2629 3.2629 3.2629 3.2629 3.2629  
 12.02 12.02 12.02 12.02 12.02 12.02 12.02  
 Testing for the absence of   i  
 - overreaction with gap >0 0.0003 0.1246 0.0983 0.0015 0.0147 0.0338 0.0374  
 - overreaction with gap <0 0.0005 0.1207 0.1003 0.0033 0.0154 0.0829 0.1059  
 - overshot revision  with gap >0 0.7331 0.5198 0.3822 0.7104 0.6916 0.649 0.5755  
 - overshot revision  with gap <0 0.0631 0.7271 0.7856 0.0956 0.3691 0.2209 0.2071  
 Long-run expected inflation bound: l  
 - upper-bound 4.65 4.41 4.98 4.96 5.45 5.34 5.11    
 - lower-bound 3.24 3.00 3.57 3.55 4.04 3.93 3.70    
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 panel # 2  
 Extending PMG to linear gap effects d  
 - long-run pooled gap effect = 0 0.2822         
 - long- and short-run gap effects = 0 0.5239 0.5561 0.2600 0.5574 0.3207 0.4443 0.3628 0.0313  
 Nonlinear gap effects PMG model e  
 - long-run asymmetry: 065    0.7083  
 - short-run gap effect: 014 h   0.2035  
 - nonlinear dynamics: Nh N 22    0.6717  
 - joint LR test of the restrictions above 0.4951  
 Restricted nonlinear PMG model f  
 h P2  -0.8539 -0.8655 -0.5451 -0.6417 -0.6459 -0.5322 -0.5555 -0.4622    
  -7.57 -7.74 -6.04 -6.31 -6.75 -5.42 -5.30 -4.94    
 Nh P 22    -0.6721 -0.6837 -0.3632 -0.4598 -0.4641 -0.3504 -0.3737 -0.2804    
 -5.94 -6.01 -3.92 -4.38 -4.78 -3.53 -3.47 -2.90    
 511  P  g 6.1151 6.1151 6.1151 6.1151 6.1151 6.1151 6.1151 6.1151    
 13.06 13.06 13.06 13.06 13.06 13.06 13.06 13.06    
 inflation effect when gap>0 =  5  h -2.7717 -2.7717 -2.7717 -2.7717 -2.7717 -2.7717 -2.7717 -2.7717    
 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86 -6.86    
 11  N  3.3434 3.3434 3.3434 3.3434 3.3434 3.3434 3.3434 3.3434    
 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29 13.29    
 Testing for the absence of   i  
 - overreaction with gap >0 0.0000 0.1329 0.0423 0.0060 0.0050 0.1578 0.0781 0.0640  
 - overreaction with gap <0 0.0000 0.1305 0.0466 0.0075 0.0084 0.1717 0.0956 0.1010  
 - overshot revision  with gap >0 0.3851 0.2387 0.4396 0.7955 0.8411 0.4585 0.9160 0.7795  
 - overshot revision  with gap <0 0.0145 0.9855 0.6265 0.2700 0.1660 0.8198 0.4593 0.3199  
 Long-run expected inflation bound: l  
 - upper-bound 4.12 5.11 4.55 5.54 5.24 5.57 5.26 5.03    
 - lower-bound 2.68 3.67 3.10 4.10 3.79 4.12 3.81 3.59    
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 panel # 3  
 Extending PMG to linear gap effects d  
 - long-run pooled gap effect = 0 0.2846          
 - long- and short-run gap effects = 0 0.4961 0.3333 0.1799 0.5006 0.5194 0.3266 0.4949 0.5591 0.4761 0.3274 
 Nonlinear gap effects PMG model e  
 - long-run asymmetry: 065    0.8454  
 - short-run gap effect: 014 h   0.7642  
 - nonlinear dynamics: Nh N 22    0.5435  
 - joint LR test of the restrictions above 0.8181  
 Restricted nonlinear PMG model f  
 h P2  -0.7364 -1.0098 -0.6065 -0.7187 -0.5128 -0.9533 -0.5497 -0.3966 -0.9369 -0.5824 
  -6.31 -8.74 -6.19 -6.79 -5.42 -7.83 -5.71 -4.53 -9.22 -5.84 
 Nh P 22    -0.5339 -0.8072 -0.4039 -0.5162 -0.3103 -0.7507 -0.3472 -0.1940 -0.7344 -0.3798 
 -4.48 -7.08 -4.08 -4.80 -3.18 -6.19 -3.55 -2.17 -7.14 -3.72 
 511  P  g 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 6.3676 
 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 15.35 
 inflation effect when gap>0 =  5  h -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 -3.0278 
 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 -8.49 
 11  N  3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 3.3399 
 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 14.89 
 Testing for the absence of   i  
 - overreaction with gap >0 0.0918 0.3638 0.0166 0.0039 0.2704 0.4597 0.0082 0.3507 0.0001 0.0385 
 - overreaction with gap <0 0.0897 0.3633 0.0212 0.0051 0.2644 0.4586 0.0225 0.3723 0.0001 0.0545 
 - overshot revision  with gap >0 0.2356 0.0065 0.7501 0.9515 0.3431 0.1293 0.8214 0.4005 0.3161 0.6069 
 - overshot revision  with gap <0 0.8687 0.2967 0.3315 0.1786 0.9827 0.6482 0.1686 0.9991 0.0134 0.4788 
 Long-run expected inflation bound: l  
 - upper-bound 3.98 4.26 4.62 5.51 5.64 5.95 4.57 4.52 5.24 5.49 
 - lower-bound 2.54 2.81 3.18 4.07 4.20 4.51 3.13 3.07 3.79 4.05 
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 panel # 4  
Extending PMG to linear gap effects d  
- long-run pooled gap effect = 0 0.4348        
- long- and short-run gap effects = 0 0.7331 0.6855 0.1200 0.5136 0.5134 0.7048 0.0923 0.5698  
Nonlinear gap effects PMG model e  
- long-run asymmetry: 065    0.3740  
- short-run gap effect: 014 h   0.2614  
- nonlinear dynamics: N
h
N 22    0.9622  
 - joint LR test of the restrictions above 0.7464  
 Restricted nonlinear PMG model f  
 h P2  -0.8467 -0.6648 -0.5927 -0.6145 -0.9236 -0.7973 -0.5433 -0.3438    
  -7.71 -6.96 -6.05 -5.90 -8.10 -7.56 -5.63 -4.24    
 Nh P 22    -0.6619 -0.4799 -0.4079 -0.4297 -0.7387 -0.6124 -0.3584 -0.1590    
 -6.08 -4.85 -4.11 -4.08 -6.54 -5.65 -3.66 -1.89    
 511  P  g 6.559 6.559 6.559 6.559 6.559 6.559 6.559 6.559    
 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2    
 inflation effect when gap>0 = 5  h -2.9881 -2.9881 -2.9881 -2.9881 -2.9881 -2.9881 -2.9881 -2.9881    
 -7.46 -7.46 -7.46 -7.46 -7.46 -7.46 -7.46 -7.46    
 11  N  3.5705 3.5705 3.5705 3.5705 3.5705 3.5705 3.5705 3.5705    
 14.20 14.20 14.20 14.20 14.20 14.20 14.20 14.20    
 Testing for the absence of   i  
 - overreaction with gap >0 0.0000 0.0032 0.2824 0.0033 0.2884 0.0003 0.0665 0.0000  
 - overreaction with gap <0 0.0000 0.0036 0.2811 0.0097 0.2894 0.0005 0.0770 0.0000  
 - overshot revision  with gap >0 0.0664 0.6438 0.0916 0.6112 0.3025 0.9426 0.4916 0.0664  
 - overshot revision  with gap <0 0.0018 0.2764 0.6515 0.1043 0.9318 0.1081 0.6491 0.0018  
 Long-run expected inflation bound: l  
 - upper-bound 5.19 5.02 4.76 4.49 6.49 5.92 5.33 4.45    
 - lower-bound 3.65 3.47 3.22 2.95 4.94 4.38 3.78 2.91    
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 (a) Group definitions are in Table 4. 
(b) Maximum likelihood estimates (below, the corresponding Student-t statistics).  
(c) When in the first column there is a restriction, p-values under such null hypothesis are reported. 
(d) P-values of variable addiction to linear PMG model. Gap is measured as: )(
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(e) P-values of  restrictions to maximum likelihood estimates of the model (note that the Heaviside indicator is It = 1 if gapt-1 < 0 and   It = 0 if gapt-1  0) 
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(f) Maximum likelihood estimates of the model:  
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(g) Computed under the assumption that the consensus standard deviation is equal to the sample average (0.22). 
(i) P-values of Ho: 
hh
211   , and Ho: 1211   hh  respectively evaluated with both positive and negative gaps estimates; see also Appendix A1.2. 
(l) Interval estimation of long-run steady state households’ inflation expectations. 
 
 
